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ABSTRACT 
The natural gas industry in Canada has been going through deregulation to 
varying degrees over the past quarter century. This deregulation has had an affect 
on the price of gas, the marketing of gas, and the business practices in the 
industry. It has also had an affect on all sectors of the industry at various stages 
during this deregulation. 
This project is a qualitative analysis of the effect that these changes in the industry 
regulation have had on the downstream (transmission and distribution) sectors of 
the industry focusing on one company, Westcoast (Duke) Energy. This analysis 
was conducted using a case study to determine the current state of deregulation in 
British Columbia, the industry structure in the province, a review of the changes 
W estcoast underwent as a result of the commodity price deregulation, and the 
potential effects further deregulation might have on one of the major players in 
the industry. 
The major contribution of this project is its provision of a review of the changes 
that one transmission company underwent as a result of field price deregulation 
and the provision of some insight into the effects subsequent deregulation of the 
downstream sector might have on companies. The results of this investigation 
indicate that, for the most part, deregulation has had positive results on the 
company and have allowed it to compete more effectively with other midstream 
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compames. What also became evident during the investigation was that to 
continue to compete under this changing regulatory framework, business practices 
within the company required re-engineering to meet these new demands. 
Although the combination of deregulation policies to date have helped Westcoast 
to reduce costs, improve customer relations, and level the playing field with 
respect to equity in marketing and pricing relative to other companies in the 
industry there is still substantial discrepancy between W estcoast and other 
companies in the industry as result of the federal/provincial jurisdictional 
difference in the regulatory structure. 
·-
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CHAPTER! 
DEREGULATION OF NATURAL GAS AND THE TRANSMISSION SECTOR: 
WESTCOAST (DUKE) ENERGY CASE STUDY 
INTRODUCTION 
The price of natural gas has now been deregulated for almost 20 years. This partial 
deregulation of the upstream 1 portion of the industry has for the most part achieved its 
goal. The price of gas decreased in the short term as anticipated, the market has opened 
up allowing more players to buy and sell gas, and there is less government intervention in 
the pricing of the commoditl. What remains unanswered is what affect did these policy 
changes have on the downstream (pipeline and distribution) portion of the industry? 
Between the upstream point at which the gas is extracted and the point at which it is 
consumed lies a complex network of transactions among producers, pipelines, local 
distributors and the ultimate consumer (Broadman, 1983). This raises the question, are 
the business practices and downstream regulations that were set up under the old policy 
environment suitable in this new environment? In order to address this question, the 
following case study on Westcoast Energy provides a review of the changes that one 
transmission company underwent as a result of field price deregulation. It also provides 
some insight into the effects subsequent deregulation of the downstream sector might 
have on the company. 
1 See the Glossary of Terms in Appendix 1 for a defmition of terms. 
2 According to the Westcoast employees interviewed. 
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Deregulation Policy Background 
Regulation of the natural gas industry began "partially due to a desire to protect 
consumers from unilateral field price increases and partially due to a desire to ensure that 
Canadian producers received fair value for gas sold in export markets" (Doem, 1991). 
Changes in the marketplace and industry technology soon raised questions regarding the 
continued validity of this form of regulation. In response to these questions, deregulation 
of the upstream portion of the natural gas industry began in 1985. Early deregulation in 
Canada was first characterized by two agreements, the Western Accord and the 
Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices. These agreements between the federal 
and provincial governments involved deregulating the commodity (natural gas) or field 
price and implementing a number of tax reforms to the gathering and processing portion 
of the industry. The effect that this change in regulation would have on the downstream 
(transmission and distribution) sectors of the industry was unknown when the regulation 
was put in place. Literature exists (Broadman and Montgomery, 1983) that provides 
some insight into the potential changes that could take place in these sectors. There is 
also a body of literature that evaluates various changes in the market (Maerz and Coad, 
1990; Reid, 1998) and in natural gas supply (Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, 
1987; NEB, 1999) post-deregulation. There is even a study of the effect of deregulation 
on the behaviour of a producer (Yucul, 1990) however, there is little or no research 
available that produces empirical evidence of the changes downstream companies had to 
undergo in the wake of this change in field prices. It is this lack of evidence that 
prompted a case study on W estcoast Energy. 
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This case study focuses on Westcoast Energy, originally a British Columbia (BC) based 
company that has been in the natural gas transmission business for over 50 years. It is an 
assessment of the current state of deregulation in BC, the industry structure in the 
province, a review of the changes Westcoast underwent as a result of the commodity 
price deregulation, and the potential effects further deregulation might have on one of the 
major players in the industry. When this project began the company operated under the 
name W estcoast Energy Inc. The large energy conglomerate Duke Energy has since 
taken this company over and the company now carries on business as Duke Energy Gas 
Transmission. Because this investigation was started prior to the takeover of W estcoast 
Energy Inc. and the effects of deregulation on the company are a direct result of the way 
the company was initially structured, the company will be referred to as Westcoast 
Energy or W estcoast from here on to reflect its former state. There is no attempt in this 
work to analyze the change in ownership that occurred when Duke Energy bought 
W estcoast Energy Inc. 
The study begins with an overview of the methods used in this analysis, outlining the 
applicability of a case study and why it was chosen. 
Methods 
Research into natural gas deregulation is not prevalent in comparison to other natural 
resource policy issues. Research in this field, particularly as is relates to Canada and BC, 
focuses more on the environmental and political implications and processes than on the 
regulatory outcome. 
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Historically, the research that has taken place in the area of natural gas deregulation has 
focused on market modeling from an economic perspective or the political justification 
for natural resource regulation. It has also focused primarily on the theoretical 
perspective with little attention directed towards the practical application or outcomes 
evaluation. 
For these reasons, a case study approach was selected to provide some insight into the 
effects of price deregulation on Westcoast Energy, and the potential implications on the 
company of further deregulation. Westcoast Energy provides insights into a unique 
regulatory model. Its organizational structure is also different from other companies, 
which provides valuable insights into the industry. Because of these organizational 
differences, W estcoast provided an interesting and differentiated circumstance that has 
been dealt with in a unique way in the policy arena. It is also the uniqueness of this 
company, operating in a complex environment (both with respect to the industry and the 
regulatory environment) that provided the rationale for using a single case study as 
opposed to multiple case studies and multiple sources of evidence versus a single source 
of evidence. 
A qualitative case study has been used in this investigation. I used qualitative research 
because it is one way of addressing the information needs that revolve around an 
understanding of the policy issue at hand and a case study because "it contributes 
uniquely to our knowledge of individual, organizational, social and political phenomena" 
(Yin, 1994, p. 2). A case study has also been chosen because "case studies have a more 
diverse set of possible audiences (including: colleagues, policymakers and practitioners, 
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and special interest groups-such as industry professionals) than do most other types of 
research" (Yin, 1994, p. 129). Although this project is not likely to be the panacea for 
any of these audiences, the hope is that it will be of enough interest to those identified to 
encourage further research and investigation into the area of natural gas deregulation 
(particularly the downstream sector), in British Columbia and Canada. 
As Schramm points out, the essence of a case study is to try to explain why a decision (in 
this case deregulation) has taken place and with what results (i.e. how it has affected 
Westcoast Energy). 
The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case 
study, is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they 
were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result (Schramm, 
1971- quoted in Yin, 1994, p. 12) 
More than 20 years ago, James Coleman wrote, "There is no body of methods; no 
comprehensive methodology for the study of the impact of public policy as an aid to 
future policy." (in Rist, 1998, p. 400). Rist (1998) argues that there is still some truth to 
this infamous quote, that policy research and analysis has spun off even more 
methodologies and conceptual frameworks making the area of policy research more 
complex, not adding the clarity or insight the research was intended to add. It is my hope 
and intention that this research provides some clarity and understanding with respect to 
the natural gas deregulation policy environment in Canada. 
Cases are studied and recorded in many professional and practical fields, including 
policy, public administration, and organizational and management studies, and as a form 
of research, "defined by interest in individual cases, not by the method of inquiry used" 
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(Stake, 1998, p. 86). As Stake points out, different researchers have different purposes 
for studying cases and he identifies three types of study: intrinsic case study; 
instrumental case study; and collective case study. Intrinsic case study is undertaken 
because one wants to better understand a particular case, "because, in all its particularity 
and ordinariness, the case itself is of interest". Westcoast Energy was used as an intrinsic 
case study because it is a unique company in the way it developed and is currently 
structured. It was also chosen because it is a well-established company originating in 
British Columbia, with a substantial history in the industry. 
Case studies can also be conducted with a combination of purposes in mind, such as is 
the case in this instance where the reasons were both intrinsic and instrumental. 
Instrumental case study "provides insight into a particular issue, plays a supportive role, 
and facilitates our understanding of something else" (Stake, 1998, p. 88). Case 
researchers study "a case" to determine what is common about it and what is different or 
unique about it. According to Stake, this uniqueness can include: the nature of the case, 
its historical background, the physical setting, other contexts, including economic, 
political, legal, and aesthetic (Stake, 1998). In the case ofWestcoast Energy, its 
commonality does not extend beyond the fact that it gathers, processes and transports gas 
in a similar fashion, using similar technology to other companies in the industry. It has a 
unique historical background, which is outlined in detail in Chapter 3. It is unique in the 
legal sense in that it is a company that is vertically integrated (a company involved in 
more than one step in the supply chain) in the natural gas industry, and in the political 
sense in that it is regulated in a different way than other companies in the industry. As a 
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result of the uniqueness of the company used in this case study, the results of the study do 
not and cannot be generalized to the effects of deregulation on other companies (as case 
study researchers are often want to do) but does provide insight into the impact of 
deregulation on a unique company in the industry and provides insight into a corporate 
response to a changing regulatory environment. 
Because of the type and variety of information required in this study, multiple sources of 
evidence were used to investigate this policy phenomenon including archival records, 
various documents and interviews. The investigation began with a literature review and I 
attended a course on the natural gas industry in Calgary to provide the required 
operational background. Natural gas regulation and deregulation policy was then 
reviewed to acquire an understanding of the regulatory arena and the rationale behind 
deregulation as it has progressed to date. The third component of the study was an in-
depth evaluation ofWestcoast Energy. This study included a detailed review ofthe 
company's history and development, its organizational structure- from a business 
perspective as well as in comparison to other companies in the natural gas industry, an 
examination of its regulatory history and structure and finally, by conducting a number of 
structured interviews with key members of the organization to obtain various internal 
perspectives on the past, present and projected future effects of deregulation on the 
company. 
The employees interviewed hold positions at various levels of responsibility within 
Westcoast Energy in the Regulatory Services and Pipeline Operations areas. During 
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research projects, a number of details are often provided about those being interviewed to 
give the reader the ability to assess their credibility or capacity to answer the questions 
posed to them. These details may have included what role they played within the 
company or their job title, the length of time they have been with the company, their age, 
education and other relevant details. Due to the request for anonymity by some of the 
participants this information was not pursued in this case. 
Based on a questionnaire distributed in advance, respondents were asked, via four 
individual teleconference interviews, to provide their opinions on a number of 
deregulation activities that had taken place over the past 17 years and what effect those 
activities have had, if any, on the company. 
The structured interviews consisted of a question and answer dialogue in which seven 
questions were discussed (see Appendix 5). The questions covered: the pros and cons of 
deregulation of the natural gas industry; how those regulatory changes affected the sector 
to which they applied (gathering and processing); what effect the deregulation of one 
sector in the industry had on another (transmission); what particular effect the Western 
Accord and the Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices (the two major 
deregulation policy initiatives considered) had on Westcoast; how subsequent regulatory 
changes have affected the company; and what the anticipated results of further 
deregulation of the industry would be, specifically the deregulation of the transmission 
sector of the industry. A summary of the results of these interviews can be found in 
Chapter 4. 
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The information obtained through the interviews on the seven topics identified has been 
consolidated and summarized to maintain anonymity and to eliminate some duplication 
of information. This information was placed under the question that was most 
appropriate for the discussion. For example, one respondent's response to question 2 was 
directly related to question 6, so was detailed where most relevant. 
As mentioned previously, Duke Energy purchased Westcoast Energy (in September 
2001) during this study. To date there have been few changes in the structure of 
Westcoast Energy in comparison to the state it was in when this project began. The way 
the company developed and its current structure are what differentiates the company from 
others in the industry. 
This unique structure also is responsible for the type of regulatory model that evolved 
during the company's development. These two variables have not changed with the new 
ownership of the company and therefore it was felt that the basis for this case study 
analysis was still valid. 
Chapter 2 provides a history of natural gas deregulation in British Columbia and an 
overview of the current regulatory structure and management of the industry. The 
present regulatory structure governing Duke Energy (Westcoast Energy) is then 
described, outlining its differences and the reason a unique regulatory structure has been 
created. Chapter 3 discusses the case study background and a history ofWestcoast 
Energy and the evolution of the company from a small but ambitious company in the 
transmission sector of the business to a diversified, international company that is to date a 
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major player in the natural gas industry. Chapter 3 also provides some insight into effects 
that the regulation and deregulation policy changes have had on the company and the 
changes these policies prompted. A detailed analysis of deregulation of the natural gas 
industry is reviewed in Chapter 4. The chapter provides a broad analysis of the 
deregulation of the industry and then proceeds to evaluate in detail the changes to the 
gathering and processing sectors (as a result of the implementation of the Western 
Accord and the Agreement on Natural Gas Marketing and Prices), the effects of these 
changes on Westcoast Energy, and the possible changes to the transmission and 
distribution sectors should further deregulation occur. 
The final chapter provides the summary and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER2 
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY REGULATION AND MANAGEMENT IN BRITISH 
COLUMBIA 
Introduction 
To understand natural gas regulation it is important to understand how the industry in BC 
is structured, how it is managed, its development history and the reasons behind why 
regulation came about. Regulation is, as Hessing and Howlett (1997) point out, one of 
the more prominent policy implementation tools in the natural resource policy arena, and 
"has been by far the most favoured government technique for controlling or restricting 
the activities of individuals and companies involved in various forms of resource 
harvesting, extraction, processing, and sales" (p. 172). The natural gas industry has 
moved from a fully regulated environment to one in which regulation is becoming less 
prevalent. It is this history and regulatory pathway that is described below. 
The Natural Gas Industry 
The natural gas industry is comprised of four sectors: exploration, production, 
transportation and distribution. The exploration sector consists of companies conducting 
seismic surveys3 to locate the reserves of oil and natural gas. If seismic surveys indicate 
the presence of oil or natural gas then the appropriate permits are obtained from the 
provincial regulatory body and drilling begins to determine the quantity and quality of the 
resource. The three stages of the production process then begin, which involve 
completing the well, bringing the gas to the surface, and finally, purifying the gas (CERI, 
1999). If the gas found is more or less pure, it can be processed at small field facilities 
3 See Glossary for a defmition of terms. 
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that remove moisture and other simple contaminants. From there it can be piped directly 
into a larger pipeline for transportation to market. 
Most gas is not "pure" and requires processing after it has been extracted to remove 
contaminants (moisture, hydrogen sulphide, and carbon dioxide) and to extract other 
commercially valuable substances from the gas stream. For example, most natural gas 
reservoirs typically contain other hydrocarbons such as ethane, propane, butane and 
natural gas liquids. In Alberta this gathering and processing forms part of the production 
sector, however in BC, gathering and processing forms part of the transportation sector 
due to the unique way in which W estcoast Energy was developed. 
Once processing is complete, the natural gas is then injected into transportation 
pipelines for transmission to the local, smaller distribution pipelines that take gas 
directly to residential, commercial and industrial consumers. Virtually all natural gas 
produced and consumed in North America is transported by pipeline. 
Management of the Industry 
Management of the natural gas industry in British Columbia involves three main groups: 
all the companies in the various sectors of the industry (see Exhibit 1); the provincial 
regulatory body (The British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission); and the federal 
regulatory body (The National Energy Board). The British Columbia Oil and Gas 
Commission, created by the Provincial government in 1998 administers all legislation 
pertaining to the crude oil, natural gas and pipeline activities within the province. The 
National Energy Board was created by an Act ofParliament in 1959 and has regulatory 
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Exhibit 1 - The Companies in the various sectors of the natural gas industry in BC 
Com[2anies in the Ex[2/oration Com[2anies in the Com[2anies in the 
and Production Sector Transmission Sector Distribution Sector 
Anadarko Canada Corporation Alliance Pipeline Ltd. BC Gas Utility Ltd./Centra 
Aquila Canada Corporation BC Gas Inc. (Southern Crossing Pacific Northern Gas Ltd. 
Apache Canada Ltd. Pipeline) 
ARC Resources Ltd. Westcoast Energy Inc. (Duke 
BP Canada Energy Company Energy) 
Burlington Resources Canada Ltd. 
Canadian Forest Oil Ltd./Producers 
Marketing Ltd. 
Chesapeake Energy Marketing, Inc. 
Chevron Canada Resources Limited 
Devon Canada Corporation 
Dominion Energy Canada Ltd. 
EnCana Corporation 
ENCO Gas, Ltd. 
Enserco Energy Inc. 
Entegral Gas Marketing Inc. 
Husky Energy Marketing Inc. 
Imperial Oil Resources Limited 
Kaiser Energy Ltd. 
Macon Resources Ltd. 
Marathon Canada Limited 
Mobil Oil Canada/Mobil Natural Gas 
Company Ltd. 
Murphy Oil Company Ltd. 
NCE Petrofund Corp 
Paramount Resources Ltd. 
Pengrowth Corporation 
Penn West Petroleum Ltd. 
Petro-Canada Oil and Gas 
Petrorep Resources Ltd. 
Phillips Petroleum Company 
Pioneer Natural Resources Canada 
Inc. 
Purcell Energy Ltd. 
Samson Canada, Ltd. 
Shiningbank Energy Ltd. 
Storm Energy Inc. 
Suncor Energy Inc. 
Talisman Energy Inc. 
Unocal Canada Limited 
Vintage Petroleum Canada, Inc. 
Willis Energy Services Ltd. 
powers over the authorization of exports of oil, gas and electricity; the authorization of 
the construction of interprovincial and international oil, gas and commodities pipelines 
and international power lines; the setting of just and reasonable tolls for pipelines under 
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federal jurisdiction; and the regulation of oil and gas activities on Canada's lands in the 
north. The act also required that the Board keep under review the outlook for Canadian 
supply of all major energy commodities including electricity, oil and natural gas and their 
by-products, and the demand for Canadian energy both domestically and abroad (NEB, 
2002). 
The management structure can be discussed in terms of two regulatory regimes. The first 
is the closed or highly regulated regime, the second is the open or deregulated regime. 
Presently two of the sectors, transmission and distribution, in the natural gas industry fall 
in the "highly regulated" category and two, exploration and production, in the 
"deregulated" category. How these sectors are regulated and who is responsible for this 
regulation is outlined in the section entitled "Current Regulation" but before identifying 
the current structure it is important to understand the history behind the regulation of the 
industry and the reason for the transition to partial deregulation. 
History 
The energy industry has been an important part of Canada's economy in terms of 
investment, trade, income generation, and employment for over a century. It currently 
employs more than 280,000 Canadians and accounts for 6.8 per cent of the GDP (gross 
domestic product) and 16 per cent of total investment in Canada (Energy Council of 
Canada, 2001). Canada is the fifth largest energy producer in the world (2/3 of this 
produced in Alberta) after the US, Russia, China and Saudi Arabia and the sixth largest 
energy consumer in the world (CERI, 1999). 
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It is the ongoing and increasing importance of this industry, coupled with its 
characteristics that prompted the need for regulation. In some industries, regulation was 
imposed to prevent abuses that had previously been endured (such as the application of 
market power in natural monopolies) and to ensure that all parties had equal access to 
information and services. For example, other regulation ensured that safety and health 
(in the food, drug, and aircraft 
Exhibit 2 - Make up of Primary Energy Production in Canada 
Natural gas 36% 
Oil 23% 
Hydropower 20% 
Coal 11% 
Nuclear 4% 
Other 6% 
70% is consumed in Canada, 30% is exported 
.. 
CERI Trammg session 03/2002, Calgary, Alta 
industries, for example) would be maintained. Such regulation attracted little criticism, 
since it clearly appeared in the public interest. (National Museum of American History, 
Smithsonian Institute, 2001). 
Because utilities are a public service, government has played a substantial role in defining 
the terms of the business. This interaction between private decision-making and public 
policy makes for a complex economic environment. Arguably, the justification for the 
ongoing application of regulation is to safeguard the environment and to maintain 
programs such as low-income programs, energy-efficiency initiatives, and R & Don 
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alternative technologies. These programs are clearly desired by the public, but they 
might hold little interest among competitive companies that seek to minimize costs. 
Regulation was also supposed to provide stability in unstable markets by limiting 
competition while controlling the worst monopoly abuses (Kahn, 1991). 
In Canada, the Canadian Constitution divides the power to set energy policy between the 
provincial and federal governments. The provincial governments own the natural 
resources, and they are responsible for most aspects of regulation and energy sector 
development within their geographical boundaries. The federal government is 
responsible for harmonizing energy policy at the national level, promoting regional 
economic development, frontier lands, offshore development, interprovincial facilities, 
plus international and interprovincial trade (Energy Council of Canada, 2001 ). 
In 1985 the regulators' roles began to change in the energy industry, beginning with the 
natural gas sector. Economic, protectionist and regulatory questions were being asked. 
"Were prices at their appropriate level given supply, demand and competitive pressure? 
Were the domestic volume protection tests effective, relevant and fair? And could 
changes in utility regulation better serve some of the needs of the natural gas industry and 
consumers? Was it time for some form of deregulation?" (Haughey and Liddle, 1985). 
Deregulation 
Regulation of the natural gas industry began "partially due to a desire to protect 
consumers from unilateral field price increases proposed by Alberta and partially due to a 
desire to ensure that Canadian producers received "fair value" for gas sold in export 
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markets" (Doern, 1991, p. 7). Initially these regulations were successful however they 
became increasingly at odds with dynamic changes in the marketplace and with 
improving technology in the industry (Doern, 1991). As these changes took place it 
became apparent that some of these regulations should be changed or eliminated. The 
term deregulation was quickly adopted as these regulations were eliminated. It should be 
noted that deregulation in this instance should not be applied literally. Deregulation as it 
relates to the natural gas industry can be described as "the process of changing natural 
gas market regulations to allow a greater role for market forces to balance supply and 
demand and set prices". It does not mean the complete absence of regulation. 
Deregulation has been applied in a limited way to a portion (gathering and processing 
sectors) of the natural gas industry. Prior to 1985, federal and provincial regulators were 
involved in establishing natural gas prices. In 1985, the federal and provincial 
governments signed landmark agreements that began to change the regulatory and pricing 
structure ofthe industry. The Western Accord effective June 1, 1985 (see Appendix 2), 
was the government's first step toward deregulating the energy industry. It was designed 
to revitalize the Canadian energy industry by deregulating the crude oil pricing and 
marketing, and eliminating a number of federal oil and gas taxes or charges including the 
Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax - a federal tax on all production revenue over $1 0,000; 
the Petroleum Compensation Charge - revenues which were used for import 
compensation purposes; and the Canadian Ownership Special Charge- the proceeds of 
which were used to defray part of the cost of the acquisition of Petrofina by Petro-Canada 
(Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, 1985a). 
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Shortly after the Western Accord was signed, the "Agreement on Natural Gas Markets 
and Prices" (see Appendix 3) was signed November 1, 1985 with the intent of creating a 
more flexible and market-oriented pricing regime for the domestic pricing of natural gas. 
The result of this deregulation was the transfer of price setting from the governments to 
the markets (see Exhibit 3 for a before and after schematic) allowing the price of all 
natural gas in interprovincial trade to be determined by negotiation between buyers and 
sellers instead of being set by the regulators. 
Deregulation of the natural gas gathering and processing sectors (in the general sense in 
the industry) was due in large part to the inflexibility as a result of the link of natural gas 
prices to crude oil prices, limiting economic activity. From 1975 to 1981 gas prices were 
set at about 85 per cent of crude prices; from 1981 to the end of 1984 the relationship was 
65 per cent. The natural gas industry and gas consumers argued to governments that a 
pricing system that linked gas prices to oil prices was too inflexible, and that a pricing 
regime that is responsive to natural gas market conditions was necessary (Energy, Mines 
& Resources Canada, 1985). As Haughey and Liddle (1985) point out, the natural gas 
industry had reached a stage at which current markets were saturated, gas supply was at 
an all-time high, and consequently exploration was reduced. Due to the regulation in 
place, the industry could not adjust prices in accordance with market demand and 
competitive pressures. Nor could they adjust provincial and export volumes or the 
pipeline rate design. The Western Accord and the Agreement on Natural Gas Markets 
and Prices were intended to spur economic growth and alleviate some of the competitive 
pressures on the industry, putting an end to controversial energy taxes and providing a 
more market- oriented pricing regime. 
Page 18 
Exhibit 3 -Natural Gas Marketing: Before and After Deregulation 
Natural gas ma-rketing - Pre-1985 
Residential/Commercial 
Industrial/Electrical· 
Natural gas mar.keting - After deregulation 
Independent Marketers 
----1' Transportation 
----+ Marketing 
Source: Petroleum Communication Foundation 
Producing companies now sell to many different kinds of buyers, including industrial customers, 
independent marketers, local distribution companies, marketing companies and other sales 
organizations. 
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As mentioned, these beginnings to natural gas industry deregulation only applied to 
production sector gathering and processing. The transmission (including gathering and 
processing in BC) and distribution sectors were still heavily regulated based on the 
argument that these sectors were a monopoly. It was not until much later (1998) that 
gathering and processing and transmission in BC were re-regulated with the development 
of Light Handed Regulation and Incentive-based Tolling. The following section outlines 
in detail the current regulatory and governance structure as it relates to each sector of the 
industry. 
Current Regulatory Structure 
The regulatory structure governing natural gas in Canada is a complex one guided by the 
constitutional division of powers between the federal and provincial governments. 
British Columbia is the exception to this rule due to the prominence of W estcoast Energy. 
To understand the significance of this departure it is important to understand first the 
governance of the neighboring provinces and as such the regulatory structure in BC as it 
applied to W estcoast Energy is discussed in the subsequent section. 
Regulation of the exploration sector is controlled primarily by the provincial authorities. 
In Alberta it is the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (EUB) and in British Columbia it 
is the Oil and Gas Commission (OGC). Regulations are applied to the spacing ofwells to 
protect correlative rights and ensure orderly development of the resource base, and to 
pooling (the combination ofrights of owner A and owner B) when lease boundaries don't 
match the drill spacing unit. Well drilling also falls under exploration regulation and the 
well license application has to include the type of well, the intended depth and formation, 
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the intended surface location, and the direction ofthe well (CERI, 1999, section 8, p 8-9). 
The marketing of the gas, that was once heavily regulated, is now deregulated and the 
market sets the price boundaries. 
Production regulations, which are again a primarily provincial jurisdiction (under the 
British Columbia Utilities Commission), govern royalties4 and removal permits as well as 
the less well-known areas of production including production testing, commingling, 
rateable take, gas injection, gathering lines, processing plants, gas flaring, and well 
abandonment (CERI, 1999, section 9, p. 18). Again, regulations on pricing have been 
lifted and are now set by the market 
The transportation (pipelines) and distribution of natural gas continue to be regulated 
from both the pricing and production perspectives. In these areas, regulators oversee the 
building and expanding of the pipeline system, they determine the type of services the 
pipeline can offer, set the tolls or rates for those services, issue export licenses, and 
oversee worker health, public safety and environmental matters. Federal authorities in 
Canada (and in the US) regulate inter-provincial and international pipelines and 
provincial authorities (except in the case of the territories) regulate intra provincial 
activity. The transportation and distribution sectors of the industry are considered 
"natural monopolies" because the cost, demand and behavioural conditions are such that 
the most efficient way to provide the service is from one company (CERI, 1999). The 
following Canadian Energy Research Institute excerpt provides the reason for natural gas 
pipelines being designated as natural monopolies. 
4 See Glossary for a definition of terms. 
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"Specifically, natural gas pipelines are considered a natural monopoly 
because: they have technical economies of scale; they are not subject to 
significant competition from other forms of transportation; the high capital 
cost of building a pipeline creates a barrier to competition; and duplication 
of pipelines would be wasteful in an environmental and economic sense" 
(CERI, 1999, Section 10, p. 30). 
Westcoast Energy and Regulation in BC 
In contrast to the other provinces in Canada, particularly Alberta (Canada's 
largest producer of natural gas), British Columbia's natural gas industry differs in 
a number of ways, creating a unique regulatory model (See Exhibit 4). 
Normally the natural gas industry is broken down into the four sectors 
(exploration, production, transportation and distribution) mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, and regulated accordingly. Companies usually fall into one sector and do 
not often operate across sectors. For example, those that explore for natural gas 
do not usually process it. Those that process it do not usually transport it, etc. 
This sectoral division gets complicated when talking about regulation and 
deregulation. This complication arises from the fact that initial deregulation was 
applied to only a portion of the industry (gathering and processing) and this 
portion of the industry falls into different sectors in different provinces. As 
outlined in Exhibit 4, gathering and processing is most often associated with the 
production sector in Alberta. In BC, because of the way W estcoast Energy was 
developed, gathering and processing forms part of the transportation sector. 
Normally there is a clear distinction between the companies operating in the 
gathering and processing sector of the industry and the transportation or pipeline 
sector but that is not the case in BC. Not only is Westcoast the dominant 
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Exhibit 4 - Industry Development Comparison 
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company in these two areas of the industry but the regulators have tied these 
sectors together in BC due to the seamless vertical integration of the company. 
As a result of the integration ofWestcoast Energy and its definition in law as "a 
single undertaking", the gathering lines and processing plants are considered to be 
an "integral part of the pipelines to which they are connected on each side". 
Because those pipelines cross inter-provincial and international boundaries the 
entire system (undertaking) falls under federal regulation (Federal Court of 
Canada, 1995). 
In Alberta, as pointed out, the majority of the industry falls under provincial 
regulation with only those transmission lines that cross provincial or international 
boundaries being governed by the federal NEB. BC is the opposite in that the 
majority of the industry falls under federal regulation. This anomaly is due to the 
difference in the way the BC industry has developed. Westcoast's processing 
plants are larger than any in Alberta and the other provinces; the industry is still 
very much vertically integrated with one company (Westcoast Energy) controlling 
the majority of the gathering, processing, and transmission sectors of the industry; 
and all the major pipelines in the province are connected. Because of this 
integration and the fact that a number of the transmission pipelines cross 
provincial or international boundaries, the jurisdiction over these lines falls within 
the federal purview of the National Energy Board. It is not the interprovincial or 
international nature of the pipelines that differentiates the BC system from 
Alberta and the other provinces (there are also lines in Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Ontario that cross those borders) but the fact that W estcoast owns and operates 
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the gathering, processing and transportation facilities as a single enterprise and all 
the BC lines are connected to those that cross the borders. BC exports more than 
half the natural gas it produces, and once a pipeline crosses interprovincial or 
international boundaries that entire pipeline, regardless ofhow much of it lies 
within provincial boundaries is regulated by the NEB. In Alberta, for example, 
there are a number of transmission lines that begin and end within provincial 
boundaries and are therefore provincially regulated. 
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CHAPTER3 
CASE STUDY BACKGROUND 
The History ofWestcoast Energy 
Although natural gas development in British Columbia began in the early 1900's there 
was no way to get the large natural gas reserves to the most populated area of the 
province-to where the market was. It was this transmission of natural gas from north to 
south that was promoted and developed by W estcoast Energy founder Frank McMahon. 
The company started out as Westcoast Transmission Company Limited (WTCL) and 
constructed the first "big-inch" (30 inches in diameter) natural gas pipeline in Canada. 
Westcoast Energy now has a footprint stretching from Port Hardy, British Columbia on 
the west coast to Goldboro, Nova Scotia on the east coast and from Fort Liard in the 
north to the Bay of Capeche, Mexico in the south (Westcoast Energy, 2002). Included in 
this footprint are business interests in natural gas gathering, processing, transmission, 
storage and distribution, and power generation. Westcoast has also diversified into the 
international energy business, financial and information technology, and energy services. 
When W estcoast Energy Inc. was purchased by the US energy giant Duke Energy in 
September 2001, a new chapter began. The following is a brief review of the company's 
development. Emphasis should be added to the word "brief' here as entire books have 
been written on the history and development ofWestcoast. Only the highlights that relate 
to this particular project are provided. 
Page 26 
The Beginning 
As mentioned in chapter 2, the natural gas industry is divided into four sectors, 
exploration, production, transportation (also referred to as the transmission sector or the 
pipeline sector), and distribution. Westcoast Transmission Company Limited (as it was 
then called) began, as the name implies, in the transmission sector as a company that 
wanted to develop a natural gas pipeline from northern to southern BC. Unfortunately 
there was little proof or agreement in the industry that there were sufficient, proven 
natural gas reserves in the Peace River country to support a pipeline of this magnitude. 
McMahon's only real support was from geologists in both England and the United States 
that felt "the northern part of British Columbia was one of the largest favourably situated 
but unexplored geological areas of the world" (Westcoast Transmission Company 
Limited, 1982, p. 1 ). Because these gas reserves were as yet unproven, permission to 
proceed with the pipeline only came after the company could secure permission from the 
Alberta Government to transport surplus Alberta gas beyond provincial boundaries and 
justify an expansion of the target market to include the western United States. The 
constitutional division of powers between the federal and provincial governments 
dictated that interprovincial and international transmission of gas fell within federal 
jurisdiction. This prompted the Canadian Parliament to enact the Pipelines Act of 
Canada. Shortly thereafter, Westcoast Transmission (WTCL) was incorporated on April 
29, 1949 after being granted federal incorporation by a special act ofParliament 
(Westcoast Transmission Company Limited, 1982). This was not the end ofthe federal 
government's involvement in Westcoast's business. 
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After more that 20 years of exploration in the oil and gas fields of Alberta and BC and a 
plethora of companies developed in partnership with whoever would finance these forays, 
Westcoast's pipeline construction finally began in the Peace River country on "what was 
then the most northerly natural gas pipeline in the world and the first to export natural gas 
from Alberta" (Gray, 1982 p. 128). Because the pipeline ran from Pouce Coupe to 
Dawson Creek if could be argued that this was a BC pipeline. However because the gas 
field crossed into Alberta this pipeline was deemed to be an inter-provincial line-the 
first in Canada (Gray, 1982). It was the development of this field and pipeline that paved 
the way for McMahon's next big project-the north/south pipeline. 
After six years (in 1955) Westcoast was finally granted permission to build a pipeline to 
Vancouver. That same year, on November 25, 1955, after many battles with the 
regulatory agencies in the U.S., ("a record 357 days of public hearings before regulatory 
bodies, spread out over four years: 217 days before the Federal Power Commission in 
Washington, 136 days before the Alberta Oil and Gas Conservation Board in Calgary, 
and four days before the Board ofTransport Commissioners in Ottawa") (Gray, p. 181), 
the appropriate permits were obtained and WTCL received permission to export natural 
gas to the U.S. With "the long regulatory struggle over, the physical struggle to build the 
pipeline was about to begin" (Westcoast Transmission Company Limited, 1982, p. 5). 
The pipeline extended from Taylor, B.C. in the north, through the Peace River country, 
the Cariboo and the Coquihalla Pass to Hope and the international boundary of 
Huntingdon to connect with the Pacific Northwest Pipeline. This route traversed 650 
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miles of provincial and federal lands and the pipeline had an initial operating capacity of 
between 350 (Westcoast Transmission Company Limited, 1982) and 400 million cubic 
feet per day (Gray, 1982). Of this initial capacity, 50 million would be for BC 
consumers and the balance would be exported to the United States (Gray, 1982). Half a 
century later, Westcoast continues to export a substantial portion ofBC's natural gas to 
the Pacific Northwest. 
In the fall of 1957 Westcoast expanded its business into the processing side ofthe 
industry. The completion of a gas scrubbing, refinery and sulphur recovery plant at 
Taylor was required to process the gas that was to be piped south. The company's 
expansion was aided by the completion of the railway and the subsequent boom that it 
brought to the Interior ofBC. The railway provided Westcoast with an additional means 
of marketing its by-products (sulphur and propane) from the Taylor plant (Westcoast 
Transmission Company Limited, 1982). 
Development and Expansion 
The Taylor plant was the introduction to a decade of expansion for Westcoast. 
Expansion that came at a cost but was required to develop the gathering system required 
to feed the north to south pipeline. The decade began with a 250-mile pipeline expansion 
that began in Fort Nelson and connected into the Westcoast mainline (see Exhibit 5). 
This project was developed by Gas Trunk Line of British Columbia Ltd, a company 
formed by Westcoast in association with Pacific Petroleums, El Paso Natural Gas and 
other producers. In 1964 a second processing plant (the biggest of its kind in North 
America at the time) was built at Fort Nelson and a 402 kilometre mainline expansion 
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Exhibit 5- Westcoast (Duke) Energy Pipeline System 
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took place to provide pipeline access to newly found resources. In 1968 the founder, 
under a Westcoast subsidiary called Pacific Northern Gas Ltd. (a phenomenon that was a 
development norm for F. McMahon), built a pipeline from Summit Lake to Prince 
Rupert. This was to be Frank McMahon's last pipeline prior to retirement. That same 
year, in partnership with Bechtel Corporation, planning began on an oil and gas pipeline 
that would run from Alaska all the way down to the lower 48 states. This pipeline was 
the forerunner to what is well known today as the Foothills Pipeline (Westcoast 
Transmission Company Limited, 1982). This continued development and expansion of 
W estcoast increased the assets of the company but did not provide the increased revenues 
required to continue to operate and continue to expand. This slow return on investment 
was due in part to the long term, low priced export contracts that were in place. It took a 
two-year struggle (1966- 1968) before Westcoast received permission from the US 
Federal Power Commission and the NEB to win the approval for larger export sales at 
higher prices-approval that was projected to finally put the pipeline on solid financial 
footing (Gray, 1982). 
The Stabilization and Diversification of Westcoast Energy 
The 1970' s were a decade of diversification, regulatory intervention and development for 
Westcoast. This diversification included a merger with two affiliates (Western Pacific 
Products and Crude Oil Pipelines, and Westcoast Production) to create Westcoast 
Petroleum Ltd, an integrated exploration, production, and pipeline company with 
extensive oil and gas holdings in western Canada, Yukon Territory and the Northwest 
Territories (NWT). 
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The spring of 1973 saw a significant change in the company's role in the province's 
natural gas industry. The following is a summary in a historical brochure by Westcoast 
Transmission of the events that took place that would rescue the company from its worst 
financial situation yet. 
The provincial government established the British Columbia Energy 
Commission to investigate the natural gas industry. Westcoast's influence 
throughout the industry was the main point of interest during the hearings. 
In response to the commission's recommendations, the British Columbia 
Petroleum Corporation was established to control the purchase and resale 
of natural gas. In effect it created a royalty-gathering Crown Agency 
inserted between the gas producer and the pipeline. Henceforth, all 
producers in the province would sell to the Petroleum Corporation, which 
in tum would sell the gas to WTCL. The difference between the buying 
and selling price would be collected as a type of royalty by the 
government. In November 1973, Westcoast assigned to the Petroleum 
Corporation all its BC gas purchase contracts. Under this agreement in 
perpetuity, WC remained as a company conducting interprovincial and 
international business under the jurisdiction of the federal government and 
the National Energy Board. Since WTCL no longer would have control 
over pricing, its future revenue would be based on a cost-of-service 
contract, which provided an assured return on investment. In effect, 
WTCL relinquished all opportunities for marketing profits as a trade-off 
for the security of regulated down-side protection as payment for the use 
of its utility system (Westcoast Transmission Company Limited, p. 12). 
As a result of this change in the industry "W estcoast' s gas purchase prices, sales prices, 
and profits had all ceased to be determined by market competition and were set by 
government regulation" (Gray, p. 282). According to Gray, this transition from the 
competitive market to regulated earnings resulted in greater profits for Westcoast than 
ever before. This system was advantageous to the gas producers and to WTCL but the 
primary beneficiary was the provincial government when it received royalty revenues of 
$13 million. This provincial revenue increased even further to $527 million in 1980 
(Westcoast Transmission Company Limited, 1982). 
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The early 70's also marked the first time in the company's history that they could not 
meet customer demand (Westcoast Transmission Company Limited, 1982). This 
prompted the development of yet another partnership with what is now known as NOV A 
to form Foothills Pipe Lines Ltd to transport gas south from the NWT. Again WTCL ran 
into regulatory intervention and the plans to pipe natural gas from the northern part of the 
country to the growing south went through a number of changes, due in part to the Berger 
Inquiry that recommended a 10-year postponement of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline and 
a ban for all time on a pipeline along the north slope of the Yukon Territory. Eventually 
(after 5 years of bureaucracy and project redesign) approval was obtained to develop a 
large diameter straight-through pipeline to the US, the Canadian portion of the Alaska 
Highway project. 
The Foothills pipeline project was projected (by the company president at the time, Ed 
Phillips) to "triple the size ofWestcoast within four to five years in terms of assets 
administered, equity investment, and volume of energy handled" (Newman, 2002). 
In 1978 the federal government also became an indirect partner ofWTCL with the 
development of Petro-Canada and its purchase of Phillips and Pacific Petroleum 
companies which held one third of the Westcoast Transmission shares. Subsequently in 
1980, British Columbia Resources Investment Corporation (BRIC) also became a major 
shareholder when it received the Westcoast shares held by the provincial government 
(Westcoast Transmission Company Limited, 1982). 
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Strategic Growth and the beginning of deregulation 
The eighties brought about a strategic growth plan, deregulation, plummeting oil and gas 
prices, and a change in direction for the company. This growth plan, based around the 
development of the subsidiary Westcoast Petroleum, was successful in quadrupling 
production by 1985. This wave of success was interrupted the following year by a 
recession and commodity prices went through the floor. Pipeline growth aspirations were 
also stymied by economics and politics, although there were high hopes for Mulroney's 
proposed natural gas deregulation (Newman, 2002). 
Deregulation was expected to make business easier to conduct and to stabilize the gas 
exports that underpinned WTCL's revenue. However, according to Newman (2002, p. 
129) "the impact of deregulation on future income was uncertain. It would ensure the 
predictability that pipelines depend upon, but it would also create competition in areas 
such as gas marketing. Deregulation might be good business but it came without a 
guarantee of an upside for income and dividends". It was the strategic plan that carried 
Westcoast through the drastic drop in oil and gas prices in 1986 and 1987 when those less 
well managed couldn' t make it and the deregulatory process of natural gas production, 
energy export and pipeline transportation moved the industry toward continentalism and 
globalism (Newman, 2002). Ironically only a decade earlier the company relied on 
regulated prices to increase revenues and export contracts. It now is looking toward 
deregulation to make business easier and to stabilize exports. 
The decade ended with a change in leadership (M. Phelps was now at the helm), a change 
in name (from Westcoast Transmission to Westcoast Energy), and a new plan for growth 
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and expansion, which included a flurry of acquisitions including Texac Pacific Oil, Roxy 
Petroleum, AGIP and Inter-City Gas (ICG) (Newman, 2002). 
Expansion and the Impact of Deregulation 
After acquiring ICG in the late 1980's, Westcoast became primarily a natural gas pipeline 
and distribution company. In 1992, Petro-Canada sold all its shares (29%) of Westcoast 
to the general public, leaving Westcoast the freedom to chart its own course. This course 
began with the sale ofWestcoast Petroleum and the acquisition ofUnion Gas, a company 
that had been influential in "the development of energy policy and regulation that 
extended to the deregulation era" (Newman, p. 156). With the acquisition ofUnion Gas 
and deregulation came an end to the historical west to east flow of natural gas and a shift 
in the company's strategic direction. Natural gas now flowed in all directions and "rising 
competitive forces were sweeping away Westcoast's monopoly privileges and bringing 
them face to face with customers and competitors" (Newman, p. 166). At the same time 
there was a wave of opportunity as demand for natural gas increased. Deregulation 
opened up a network greater than just the east/west connection. This opening of the 
market allowed all the companies to sell and distribute gas throughout North America. 
Westcoast was ready to build a new processing plant and expand the pipeline but 
producers and distributors had a different idea and BCGas challenged W estcoast' s 
expansion in the courts. Although Westcoast won the appeal (1997 /98), the interim 
period was a time of reflection and prompted the company to change the way it did 
business. This change resulted in a restructuring of the company to drastically reduce 
costs and a retooling of how the company did business with producers and shippers 
(Newman, 2002). These court cases were based on a constitutional dispute over who had 
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regulatory jurisdiction, the province ofBC or the federal government, over which section 
of the industry, and under what circumstances. They were also pivotal in reinforcing the 
difference between how W estcoast operated its business versus how other companies in 
the industry, both within BC and in other provinces, operated. Exhibit 6 provides a 
summary of these decisions. 
This new way of doing business for W estcoast was guided by two instruments. 
One, a series of toll settlements (beginning in 1996) aimed at providing a period 
of orderly transition for the regulation of Westcoast' s pipeline tolls from the 
existing full cost of service method to a more light -handed method of regulation, 
and two, an arrangement between the shippers and W estcoast Energy (in 1998) 
that would implement a method of light-handed regulation on the gathering and 
processing services provided by Westcoast. This agreement was called the 
Framework for Light-Handed Regulation. Under these agreements the company 
started to negotiate prices with customers rather than having them set by the NEB. 
A new owner 
W estcoast Energy Inc. was purchased by Duke Energy in September 2001. As Peter 
Newman (2002, p. 2) so aptly described the situation at the time-"the company found 
itself at the end of its century, a $15 billion corporation competing in a $30 billion world. 
Its choice was to stagnate or to reward the faith of generations of investors by finding a 
home big enough to absorb its North American footprint". This new ownership has 
provided the size and financial strength to pursue its growth potential. 
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Exhibit 6- Jurisdictional Court Cases 
Westcoast Energy Inc. vs National Energy Board and Attorney General of Canada, 
February 9, 1996- Federal Court of Appeal Case. 
Background 
Westcoast Energy, whose primary business is the transportation of natural gas, applied 
to the NEB for certain exemption orders and certificates pursuant to the NEB Act in 
respect of proposed expansions of its gathering pipeline and processing plant facilities 
in the Fort St. John and Grizzly Valley resource areas (Federal Court of Canada). The 
Board initially adjourned the Grizzly Valley application. On the Fort St. John 
application they deemed that the proposed facilities were not federal works or 
undertakings under s. 92(10)(a) ofthe Constitution Act, 1867 and dismissed the 
application for lack of jurisdiction. The basis for this decision they argued was that "gas 
processing and gas transmission were fundamentally different activities or services" 
(Federal Court of Appeal). 
This Federal Court of Appeal case is the appeal by Westcoast ofthe Fort St. John 
decision. They also revived their Grizzly Valley application and applied to have the 
Board refer jurisdictional questions to this court as well. 
The Decision 
The Court of Appeal dealt with both facilities together and ruled on two issues: 
1) "whether the proposed facilities would constitute undertakings connecting the 
province with any other province or extending beyond the limits of the province. 
That question gave rise to the further inquiry as to whether Westcoast was 
conducting one or more than one undertaking. If there was a single undertaking, 
there could be no question that such undertaking met the requirements of92(10)(a) 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 for it extended at both its upstream and downstream 
ends beyond the limits of BC. If, on the other hand, it was determined that 
W estcoast was conducting more than one undertaking, the questions became to 
know if the undertaking the proposed facilities will form part of fell within federal 
jurisdiction. 
2) which would arise only if the first was determined in favour of federal jurisdiction, 
turned on the question whether the proposed processing plants could properly be 
considered to be included within the expression "real and personal property and 
works connected therewith" in the definition of pipeline in section 2 of the 
National Energy Board Act" (Federal Court of Appeal, p. 1). 
The Court ruled that in the case of the first question, that gathering and processing and 
transportation operations should be deemed as a single undertaking, and that with 
respect to question 2, this undertaking could and did fall within the definition of 
"pipeline". Therefore, both these matters fell under federal jurisdiction. The reasons for 
the decision on the first questions are based on the following facts : 
"( 1) It was a provider of services only; (2) Processing was required to facilitate the 
transportation service provided by it; (3) Processing was offered as a service 
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exclusively to shippers on Westcoast's mainline transmission facilities; ( 4) the fuel gas 
which went into Westcoast's mainline transmission facilities was, by far, the major 
component of the raw gas gathered and processed by Westcoast; (5) Westcoast's facilities 
were not only physically interconnected and interdependent, they were, in some cases, 
interchangeable; (6) fuel gas could be contractually delivered across provincial borders 
from all Westcoast processing plants; (7) the same personnel worked on both the 
gathering and mainline transmission pipelines and, they, together with the personnel of the 
processing plants, were subject to a unified operational control and direction; (8) 
Westcoast was the owner of all the facilities in question. Ownership is not determinative 
of constitutional jurisdiction but it certainly is not irrelevant" (Federal Court of Canada, p. 
2). 
The reason for the decision on the second question was based on the definition of 
"pipeline" in section 2 of the National Energy Board Act which included the Westcoast 
processing plants in its definition. Given that Westcoast was a "single undertaking, the 
processing plants had to be considered an integral part of the pipelines to which they were 
connected on each side" and "although processing plants were not mentioned expressly in 
the definition, the general words of the definition were broad enough to cover processing 
plants" . Therefore the Board' s jurisdiction extended to the processing plants in question 
here (Federal Court of Canada, p3). 
BC Gas Utility Ltd. V. Westcoast Energy Inc., the National Energy Board, the 
Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of British Columbia. March 
19, 1997- Supreme Court of Canada case. 
BCGas appealed the Federal Court case decision as outlined above and was supported by 
the Attorney General of British Columbia, the Attorneys General of Alberta, Nova Scotia 
and Saskatchewan. 
The Supreme Court denied this appeal in support of the previously made arguments. 
BCGas argued that, "even if the projects in issue are within federal jurisdiction, the NEB 
does not give the Board jurisdiction over gas processing plants because they do not fall 
within the following definition of"pipeline", found ins. 2: 
"pipeline" means a line that is used or to be used for the transmission of oil or gas, alone 
or with any other commodity, and that connects a province with any other province or 
provinces or extends beyond the limits of a province or the offshore area as defined in 
section 123, and includes all branches, extensions, tanks, reservoirs, storage facilities , 
pumps, racks, compressors, loading facilities , interstations systems of communication by 
telephone, telegraph or radio and real and personal property and works connected 
therewith ... 
BCGas continued to argue that, "because the processing plants are not, strictly 
speaking, for transmission, they fall outside the scope of the provision". 
The Supreme Court did not agree with these arguments and upheld the Federal 
Court of Canada decisions. 
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There would be the inevitable personnel changes as in any merger but to date, and in the 
foreseeable future, there is little change anticipated (according to those interviewed) in 
the structure of the Westcoast portion of Duke Energy. 
Summary 
This chapter has provided a review of the development history ofWestcoast Energy and 
an introduction into the regulatory problems encountered during its 50 years of 
development. This review was intended to provide the necessary background and setting 
for the Case Study. The following map (Exhibit 6) has been provided as a pictorial 
account ofWestcoast Energy's Pipeline Systems today. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE EFFECT OF DEREGULATION ON WESTCOAST ENERGY 
Introduction 
In the last decade and a half the natural gas industry has undergone a number of policy 
changes with respect to how the industry is regulated. The changes to these regulations 
have been applied to some portions of the industry (gathering and processing) and not to 
others (transmission and distribution). This case study was designed to determine 
specifically, the effect that these regulatory changes had on Westcoast (Duke) Energy, 
particularly as they relate to further deregulation and the transmission sector of the 
industry. The results of the study provide information on the pros and cons of 
deregulation from one company's perspective, providing an applied example of the 
effects of deregulation. 
Deregulation from a Westcoast perspective 
The industry as a whole 
From an industry perspective, the overall outcome of deregulation is a positive one. 
Deregulation of the Canadian gas industry shifted the pricing of natural gas from a 
federal government responsibility to an industry responsibility and opened up the market 
to a more competitive access. Prior to deregulation the pipelines purchased the gas from 
the producers or gas marketers and sold it to the local distribution companies (LDC) who 
in tum sold it to the residential, industrial and commercial customers. Deregulation 
opened up this market so that anyone could buy gas from the producers. Independent 
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marketers, the distribution companies and even the customers could buy directly from the 
producer at independently negotiated prices. This provided real competition in the 
industry. 
As a part of the deregulation policy changes, the National Energy Board relaxed its 
export controls so that a 25-year supply cushion was no longer required. This produced a 
significant over supply of gas that flooded the market all at once. This oversupply, 
coupled with the opening of the market drove prices down to almost half of what they 
were by 1987 and in the first ten years after deregulation, the demand for Canadian 
natural gas increased by over 90%. 
On the whole, demand and supply went up, exploration and production went up, security 
of supply went up, competition increased, and the price decreased. 
Although the general consensus is that deregulation is positive, this change to open 
market access led to some problems in the market, which in tum created distrust in the 
industry. Once the selling of natural gas became more market oriented and there were 
many buyers and sellers competition increased, particularly at what are called "hubs" 
where many pipelines congregate at one point for example, (Sumas). This can result in a 
very liquid market where gas can be traded as a commodity both on physical deliveries 
and on the futures markets and can lead to a suspicion of unfair trading practices taking 
place. 
Westcoast Energy Gains from Deregulation 
Financial deregulation of the gathering and processing sector has allowed Westcoast to 
compete more effectively with pricing. Westcoast is now able to adjust their service rates 
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so that they are more competitive with other mid stream companies. Prior to deregulation 
the NEB mandated fixed rates on Westcoast. With the company being regulated by the 
NEB under fixed rates and other companies in the sector being regulated provincially 
with no fixed rates for service, it gave the unregulated companies a differential 
advantage. 
With the elimination of government price setting on the commodity, the opening up of 
the access to transmission services to all market participants led to the regulation of the 
pipeline services. Not only did this allow producers access to the market, it allowed them 
to access it at the price the customer was willing to pay. There were now many buyers 
and sellers, not just the pipelines. This led the pipelines to get out of the merchant 
function, providing them a chance to focus on the core business - transporting gas. 
Deregulation ofthe gathering and processing facilities allowed Westcoast to get away 
from non-discriminatory tolls-the one-size-fits-all situation. Under non-discriminatory 
tolls the company had to provide a standard service contract. Regardless of volume there 
was a fixed toll customers had to pay for service. Because ofthe company' s vertical 
integration, this toll was applicable, regardless of whether you were moving gas through 
the Westcoast gathering system to their processing plants or through their mainline 
transmission system - one size fits all. A large portion of the tolling was based on what 
is called "postage stamp tolling". This meant that all customers shipping gas through a 
processing plant paid exactly the same price for moving their product through the plant. 
The difference in rates depended only on the variation in the composition of the gas and 
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how much of the plant was required to get it cleaned up so that it was homogenous when 
it came out of the processing plants. 
With deregulation came the relaxing of export controls and the market opened up, leading 
to the requirement for increased capacity in the pipelines to serve the new markets. This 
expansion was beneficial to Westcoast because the company now had more gas flowing 
through its pipelines. 
The Downside of Deregulation for Westcoast Energy 
The majority of those interviewed felt that overall there were few drawbacks to 
deregulation, particularly in the short term. However, it was pointed out that in the 
longer term, for a variety of reasons (including the California debacle and the Enron 
fiasco), deregulation has resulted in substantial volatility in gas prices. For the first 15 
years of deregulation the price of gas fell as the market worked toward its equilibrium. 
The market worked as the deregulation policy intended. More recently (since late 2000) 
there has been substantial volatility in the price of gas which has led to some political 
concern and consumer outrage. 
One of the goals of deregulation was to alleviate the regulatory burden on companies and 
lessen government involvement. One respondent questioned whether deregulation really 
led to a decrease in the regulatory burden or whether regulators just shifted their attention 
from economic regulation to other areas of regulatory intervention such as environmental 
regulation and public consultation requirements. 
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Changes to the Gathering and Processing Sectors 
Overall the regulatory changes to the gathering and processing sector of the company 
were viewed positively. Those interviewed suggested that the company gained flexibility 
with respect to pricing to maintain market share and that the company was able to operate 
more competitively. This leveled the playing field between the unregulated provincial 
sector (which all other plants would operate under) and the primary player- Westcoast, 
which was heavily regulated under the NEB. 
To understand the magnitude of the changes this deregulation initiated, and the chain of 
events that took place, it is important to provide some background on the development of 
this sector of the company. The significance of the unique structure ofWestcoast and its 
position in BC's natural gas business is highlighted when compared to the same sector of 
the business (gathering and processing) in Alberta. 
The gathering and processing sector consists of a number of gathering systems and the 
plants that those systems feed. In Alberta there are many plants with the gathering 
systems behind each of those plants, owned by many companies and regulated by the 
province. Competition was inherent in this system due to this multiplicity. In BC there 
are only three major plants all owned by Westcoast (Duke) Energy (with a couple of 
small plants playing a minor role), located in Fort St. John, Fort Nelson and near 
Chetwynd in the Pine River Pass area. These plants were operated on a cost of service 
basis under a "one size fits all" philosophy. All producers received the same service 
agreement based on standard terms and conditions and standard published tolls for the 
service received. This is how Westcoast operated for almost 30 years. 
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This worked in the short term but producers gradually became discontented with the level 
ofthe Westcoast tolls. As facilities started to expand to accommodate the resulting 
increase in demand and customers were charged "rolled in tolls" they became 
increasingly dissatisfied with the one size fits all philosophy and threatened to drop 
Westcoast as the processor of choice and build there own plants, arguing that they could 
build their own processing facilities for as cheap or cheaper than what Westcoast was 
charging. This discontent led to W estcoast proposing a regulatory regime that was more 
"competition friendly", a regime that moved away from a cost of service approach to a 
more market oriented approach. This regulatory regime called The Framework for Light-
Handed Regulation was agreed to by the key West coast stakeholder groups and was 
approved by the NEB. The premise of The Framework for Light-Handed Regulation is 
explained in detail in the section entitled "Subsequent regulatory changes" later in this 
chapter. 
The effect of regulatory changes to a portion of the industry 
Because of the vertical integration of the company, I was interested in determining 
whether the policy change on one portion of the business (gathering and processing) had 
any effect on its primary business - transmission. The responses to this question when 
asked were polarized. The opinions on what, if any change, deregulation of the gathering 
and processing sector had on the transmission side of the business ranged from "none at 
all" to "indirectly" to "yes it had an effect". This polarization may be attributable to the 
increasing involvement of those interviewed in a broader cross section of the company. 
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One respondent suggested that the deregulation on the gathering and processing side did 
not have any effect on the transmission side of the business. Two respondents suggested 
that the deregulation that had taken place so far had an indirect effect on the transmission 
side stating that "it has made our upstream business more competitive and more desirable 
for our customers", paving the way for settlement negotiations on the transmission side. 
One respondent thought that the extensive pipeline expansions to accommodate the 
increased volumes in supply, and the policy changes to the way the transmission of gas 
was handled were a direct result of deregulation. From an expansion perspective, the 
lifting of the 25-year supply cap and the opening up of the export market resulted in an 
excess supply of gas that required large pipeline volumes resulting in large pipeline 
expansions. Exhibit 7 is a copy of a graph 
from Westcoast that shows the dramatic increase in throughput (from about 260 Bcfin 
1985 to 667 Bcfin 1996- an increase of over 150%) on Westcoast's system in the 10 
years following deregulation (Westcoast Energy Inc., 1997). 
From a policy perspective, deregulation resulted in regulators suggesting, and imposing, a 
policy in which the pipelines would no longer purchase and sell gas on their own account. 
They would have to become open-access systems, or service providers, where others 
would transport their gas through the pipelines not the pipeline company themselves. 
The pipeline companies would become in effect the "trucking company", moving the 
product on behalf of the owners (producers, marketers or others) of that product. To 
affect this transition the pipeline companies first, had to resolve the issue of all the supply 
contracts they were presently managing. Gas purchase contracts had to be renegotiated 
and gas sales contracts to those receiving the gas at the other end of the pipeline also had 
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Throughput on Westcoast's system has increased dramatically 
since deregulation --from about 260 Bcf in 1985 to 640 Bcf in 1995 
which represents almost a 1509% increase. 
We forecast that demand will increase further during the 
foreseeable future . 
This increased throughput is reflected in the growth of Westcoast's 
pipeline assets and rate base which have increased from $700 
million in 1986 to $1.8 billion in 1995 --a 150% increase. 
Source: Source: Westcoast Energy Inc. (1997). Presentation by B. Jardine to The Australian Gas 
Association Overseas Scholars, September 19, 1997. Westcoast Energy Inc. , Pipeline Division. 
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to be renegotiated. Today companies like Westcoast and Nova simply enter into 
transportation service arrangements with their customers. 
With the financial deregulation of the gathering and processing sector and the change to 
the transmission side of the industry-from a buyer and seller of gas to strictly a 
transporter of gas--came a new and difficult regulatory relationship with the NEB. The 
NEB decided that it had to fix the cost of service and tolls for Westcoast for service 
arrangements. They wanted to fix the cost on a broad range of business activities, 
including the "assumed capital structure, the rate of return on common equity and the 
cost of service which was generally based upon what Westcoast says it costs to move a 
mcf (million cubic feet) of gas through its system. Over time this became an 
unmanageable burden for the company due to the way the NEB views Westcoast (as one 
entity including the gathering and processing facilities and the transmission pipelines). 
When none of the other players in the Canadian market were integrated in this way or 
wholly regulated under this model, it made it very difficult to compete in the market." 
This difficult regulatory relationship prompted W estcoast to negotiate a number of 
Incentive Settlements with its customers. These incentive settlements were approved by 
the NEB but for the most part left the setting of the business guidelines to those in the 
business. The only time the NEB would intervene was when complaints arose that 
Westcoast and its customers were not able to resolve. This type of negotiated business 
arrangement brought W estcoast and the BC natural gas industry closer to the Alberta 
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model, which is a more laissez-faire approach to business that involves less regulatory 
involvement. 
The Effect of the Western Accord 
The Western Accord was the federal government's first step toward deregulating the 
energy industry. It was designed to revitalize the Canadian energy industry by 
deregulating the crude oil pricing and marketing, take the first steps in making the natural 
gas industry more market-oriented, and eliminating a number of federal oil and gas taxes 
or charges including the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax, the Petroleum Compensation 
Charge, and the Canadian Ownership Special Charge (Energy Mines & Resources 
Canada, 1985a). 
When those interviewed were asked what, if any, effect the Western Accord had on 
Westcoast only half were willing to comment on this question. The other halfknew very 
little about the policy and therefore chose not to comment. Those that did comment 
pointed out that the majority of the industry changes resulting from this particular 
agreement were aimed at the oil industry. The only policy changes from this Accord that 
affected the natural gas industry were the elimination of the Petroleum and Gas Revenue 
Tax and the Canadian Ownership Special Charge. Those interviewed were not willing to 
speculate as to whether there were any indirect effects to W estcoast or the natural gas 
industry as a result of the changes to the taxes and charges specifically applied to the oil 
industry. The general view was that it was subsequent deregulation tools, including the 
Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices, the Framework for Light-Handed 
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Regulation and Negotiated Toll Settlements that had a much greater impact on 
Westcoast. 
Changes to the Marketing of Natural Gas 
The Accord resulted in changes to the marketing of natural gas in a number of ways. As 
one respondent pointed out there was a transition period that was required in which all 
the contracts had to be renegotiated as a result of the financial changes to the regulatory 
structure. Another respondent felt that it opened the market up so that the pipeline 
companies had to get out of the buying and selling business. Gas marketing became an 
independent business with a number of companies, both large and small niche market 
companies, entering that end of the business. Initially the number of companies that 
entered this field was substantial but that number has decreased in recent years to just a 
few companies. The reduction in the number of companies in the marketing business 
today may be due to the complexity of the business and due to problems that companies 
like Enron have encountered. 
The result of the elimination of the gas taxes and charges 
Although, over the long term, Westcoast revenues increased subsequent to this policy 
change and the price of natural gas decreased, it was argued that these changes in taxes 
and charges were not independently responsible for these changes. For example, the 
oversupply of gas at the time and the resulting changes due to market forces would have 
to be taken into consideration. When supply exceeds demand the price drops. Whether a 
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portion of this decrease is attributable to the elimination of the taxes can only be 
speculation. 
The respondents felt that it was likely impossible to retroactively determine the effect of 
the elimination of the gas taxes and charges on the company's bottom line. There are too 
many other variables that would affect the change in revenues and prices to make this 
determination. 
The positive effect of the elimination of the PGRT 
The elimination of the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) was supposed to 
promote large-scale reinvestment in Canada. Whether the large-scale diversification and 
expansion for Westcoast Energy in the decade following this policy (1985- 1995) was 
related to this policy change was the question. The respondents that replied to this 
question suggested that the elimination of the PGRT did have a positive effect on the 
company-albeit probably not independently. The following examples were provided. 
Westcoast expanded significantly from 1985 to 1995 through the acquisition of a number 
of other companies, including Union Gas in Ontario. TransCanada Pipelines also 
undertook huge expansions across the country and transportation infrastructure expanded 
dramatically to serve new markets. Again, as was pointed out by those interviewed 
"whether this expansion was due to the need to serve new markets and distribute the 
build up of supply or whether it was partly as a result of companies now having 
additional revenue that they did not have to pay out in taxes is pure speculation". 
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The substantial pipeline expansion that took place and the renewed interest in oil and 
natural gas exploration in Western Canada required to support those expansions would 
have been difficult to do under a fully regulated scenario. When the taxes were 
eliminated it gave the companies the opportunity to redistribute these dollars providing 
more money for exploration. 
The Effect of the Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices 
The respondents were asked to comment on the success of one of the major goals of the 
Agreement, which was to improve market access for producers, particularly the export 
markets. They were also asked to comment on whether they felt there were any other 
benefits or drawbacks of the Agreement. Again, the response to this question was limited 
to half of the respondents. 
Generally those that responded felt that the Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and 
Prices had a positive effect on Westcoast, particularly regarding the goal to improve 
market access for producers. One respondent replied: "As the producers got access to the 
expanded markets (both the domestic and the export markets) they needed a way to 
transport the gas - for Westcoast to meet that need and remain competitive it meant huge 
expansions both in gathering and processing facilities as well as in pipelines." This was 
also the case for TransCanada. So it did not just affect BC. 
This Agreement was also identified as being beneficial in terms of allowing competition 
and a greater number of people having access to pipeline capacity. This was not, 
however without its drawbacks. This change in pipeline access moved the company into 
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more economic regulation because they had to adjust how their tolls and tariffs were 
structured. One respondent felt that "this was probably the first step in deregulation and 
that the second step occurred in the mid 90 ' s when people were getting into incentive 
agreements with their shippers like TransCanada and ourselves". 
One of the other goals of this Agreement was to lower prices for consumers. All 
participants referred to the achievement of this goal throughout the interview discussions. 
Exhibit 8 illustrates the effect of deregulation on the Canadian Spot Market Export Prices 
for the decade following deregulation. 
Subsequent regulatory changes (e.g., Incentive Settlements, Framework for Light-
Handed Regulation) 
The regulatory changes that took place within Westcoast Energy subsequent to and as a 
result of the Western Accord and the Agreement ofNatural Gas Markets and Prices were 
what had the greatest effect on the company from a regulatory perspective. The Incentive 
Settlements and the Framework for Light-Handed Regulation changed the way the 
company conducted its business. 
All those interviewed who were familiar with the Framework for Light-Handed 
Regulation (the majority) agreed that its effects were positive. All those interviewed 
agreed that the subsequent Incentive Settlements were also positive and that this 
Framework and Settlements had the greatest impact on Westcoast as far as deregulation 
is concerned. Because the responses received on both of these tools are substantial, the 
remarks are summarized separately. 
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Framework/or Light-Handed Regulation 
The Framework for Light-Handed Regulation was negotiated in 1998. This framework 
provides a mechanism by which Westcoast's tolls for gathering and processing services 
will be based on negotiated arrangements, replacing the existing regulatory system with a 
complaints-based system. As a number of those interviewed pointed out, "since the 
implementation of this regulatory structure we have been able to customize deals with 
our customers and we have not had any major complaints. Those that have been lodged 
have been worked out prior to the NEB having to impose a decision". This model allows 
Westcoast to customize services to meet customer's needs. 
The rationale for this Framework was to try to maintain market share in what was now a 
very competitive natural gas processing environment. Westcoast could now enter into 
customized agreements that provided customer service on an "as required" basis at a cost 
equal to what it would cost the customer if they were to provide the services themselves 
but save them the development and capital costs. This change from a cost-of-service 
regulatory structure to a more market based approach allowed W estcoast to continue to 
effectively compete against producers who were threatening to build their own plants and 
bypass the Westcoast plants. 
To facilitate this Framework the company assumed all of the utilization risk on the 
facilities involved. To insure this risk and to remove a number of regulatory shackles, 
Westcoast wanted to be able to negotiate confidential shipper agreements and negotiate 
prices within certain limitations. These limitations were as follows: 
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11 W estcoast would publish the rates in ranges so that there was some 
transparency in pricing 
2/ They built in certain terms and conditions in the contracts general terms 
and conditions that would be the same for everyone so that there was equity in 
the service provided 
3/ There was a fair dealing policy included in the Framework which put 
certain limits on Westcoast's ability to discriminate but still allow for 
customized agreements. 
This Framework "has worked fabulously" according to those interviewed. There is still 
some regulatory oversight to the way Westcoast conducts its gathering and processing 
business in that if customers feel they are not being dealt with fairly they can still go to 
the NEB and complain. The NEB would then hold an inquiry or a hearing into whether or 
not Westcoast was dealing fairly with the complainant. To date there has been very little 
cause for NEB intervention and the Framework has led to improved customer relations 
(according to those interviewed) between Westcoast and its customers and a substantial 
reduction in the regulatory costs for the industry. 
Incentive Settlements 
This new method of regulation has resulted in tolls for gathering and processing service 
that can be negotiated based on market conditions; a reduction in the controversy arising 
from applications for expansion of service and for special tolls; a quicker response by 
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Westcoast to customer requests; more stable tolls; and an increase in activity in the 
Province to record levels just one year after ( 1997) producers threatened to leave BC. 
Some of those interviewed felt that the move to open-access was the first step in 
deregulation and the 2nd step was the move towards incentive based regulation rather than 
strict cost-of-serv-ice regulation. This resulted in Westcoast becoming a more focused 
company. Because of the cost control incentives now in place "the company looked 
more at its bottom line rather than just flowing everything through to the toll payer". 
This was seen as a benefit. "In the old cost-of-service model you tried to flow as much 
through to the shipper as you could; so that led to lengthy, yearly hearings to determine 
what your tolls for the upcoming year would be. Under incentive settlements there were 
more risks put on the pipeline to control their costs". 
The incentive settlements "allow us to make a little more than the posted returns if we do 
more and take on more risk. For example, under certain conditions, if we develop a new 
business product that has some value we will earn a share of the improved cash flow. If 
we are more efficient with our costs and use less fuel and things like that we can earn a 
share of that". Previously the company earned nothing so there was no incentive to 
improve efficiency or reduce costs. There have been three Incentive Settlement 
Agreements, the first was a one-year agreement in 1996, the second a five-year 
agreement that ran from 1997 - 2001 and a third that that is in effect for the years 2002 
and 2003. 
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Although both of these tools are working well and have helped bridge the gap for 
Westcoast between regulation and deregulation, the company still has to contend with the 
rigorous federal regulations under the NEB regarding facilities expansion and the 
building of new facilities . The Board has very long and complex processes for 
environmental and project review that can take up to 2 years (e.g., the Grizzly Valley 
extension pipeline and the new plant in the Pine River Pass area) to get approval. This 
greatly reduces any competitive advantage Westcoast has when competing with other 
companies that fall under provincial regulation in which the process is much less rigorous 
and substantially shorter. This is primarily due to Westcoast being the only gathering and 
processing business in North America that is federally regulated. 
Potential consequences of deregulation of natural gas transmission and distribution 
For deregulation to take place successfully, competition has to be there to ensure that 
market abuse does not take place. As mentioned previously, natural gas pipelines are 
considered a monopoly because they have technical economies of scale, they are not 
subject to significant competition from other forms of transportation, the high capital cost 
of building a pipeline creates a barrier to competition, and duplication of pipelines would 
be wasteful in an environmental and economic sense. This is particularly true in BC. 
There is a similar monopoly situation in BC in the distribution sector in that BC Gas is 
the primary distribution company. 
Of those interviewed, one suggested that there was already deregulation to a certain 
extent in these sectors. In the transmission sector this deregulation was in the form of 
incentive-based regulation. On the distribution side it was thought that the performance-
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based regulation was the first step in deregulation. The majority focused their discussion 
on the monopoly argument and whether or not financial deregulation could occur where a 
competitive market is not present. It was generally agreed that given a competitive 
marketplace where there is unfettered opportunity for companies to enter the transmission 
and distribution sectors, deregulation would have similar, positive effects on the industry 
to the deregulation of the gathering and processing sectors. However, this is not the case 
inBC. 
Because there is only one transporter (or at least one has the lion's share of the market), 
Westcoast, and one primary distributor, BC Gas, there is virtually no competition in the 
transmission and distribution sectors of the industry in British Columbia. If the 
transmission and distribution sectors were to be deregulated it was felt that would be a 
positive step as far as Westcoast is concerned. However, without competition, there is a 
concern about market power. Therefore, such deregulation is not likely to happen any 
time soon. 
The situation in Ontario and Alberta is substantially different in that there are a number 
of companies in the transportation and distribution business from which customers can 
choose so the fear of market power is not as prevalent. Ontario and Alberta are also 
different in that they both have substantial storage facilities allowing local distribution 
companies to purchase gas when it is cheap and store it until needed (i.e., in the winter 
time). BC does not have that same advantage, but it is part of the energy policy to build a 
storage facility in the future. 
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As was noted earlier, there is potentially a second pipeline being built in the province. If 
and when this pipeline is completed and operational, providing customers an alternative, 
financial deregulation may occur. It will be extremely important that if and when this 
additional pipeline comes on line, deregulation occurs simultaneously so that there is fair 
competition. Without deregulation there are a number of variables that would create 
unfair competition. First, the proposed pipeline will be wholly within the province and 
therefore fall under the BCUC, which does not regulate prices. Second, BC Gas, the 
proponent of the new line, is proposing to run this line across the bottom of the province, 
a new route, and tie into gas produced in Alberta which may or may not involve a price 
differential. 
The overall response to deregulation of the industry is positive. There was however some 
uncertainty regarding the effect on the company of complete financial deregulation of the 
industry. 
Summary 
The four primary deregulation tools that have had an effect on W estcoast are The 
Western Accord (June 1985), The Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices 
(November 1985), the Framework for Light-Handed Regulation (1998) and the three 
Incentive Toll Settlements (1996, 1997, 2002) (See Exhibit 9). 
The Accord and the Agreement on Markets and Prices were national agreements 
impacting, to differing degrees, all of the Western provinces. The last two tools are 
specific to Westcoast Energy and were developed by the company, in consultation with a 
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Exhibit 9 - The Deregulation tools affecting Westcoast 
Deregulation Tool Date implemented Sector of the company 
affected 
The Western Accord June 1, 1985 All sectors. The 
elimination of different 
taxes and some operating 
regulations affected the 
gathering, processing and 
transportation sectors. 
Initiated industry pricing 
restructuring discussions. 
The Agreement on November 1, 1985 All sectors. Lifted the floor 
Natural Gas Markets and ceiling prices so that 
and Prices the price for gas could be 
freely negotiated. Relaxed 
export controls to provide 
for greater market 
opportunities. 
Framework for Light- March 1998 Gathering and Processing 
Handed Regulation sector. Now operates under 
a complaints-based 
regulatory structure. The 
regulators only get involved 
if contractual disputes 
cannot be resolved by the 
_Qarties involved. 
Incentive Toll 1st Settlement - 1996 Transmission sector. 
Settlements Provides for the ability to 
2nd Settlement - 1997 - negotiate terms of service 
based on standard 
2001 agreements. 
3rd Settlement- 2002- 2003 
number of stakeholders. The Framework for Light-Handed Regulation "represents a joint 
industry solution for the ongoing regulation ofWestcoast's gathering and processing 
services by replacing the existing system of active financial regulation by the Board with 
a complaints-based system" (Westcoast Energy Inc., 1998, p. 2). The purpose of the 
Incentive Toll Settlements was to "provide incentives for Westcoast to operate in a 
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manner consistent with the increasingly competitive nature of the natural gas industry and 
incentives for Westcoast to provide competitive service to its Shippers" (Westcoast 
Energy Inc., 1996, p. 1). 
Expanding natural gas deregulation into the transmission and distribution sectors of the 
industry and how that would affect W estcoast can only be speculation at this point. What 
affect that total financial deregulation will have on the company remains to be seen but 
according to the respondents, Westcoast has found it easier to operate with minimal 
regulatory intervention. 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS 
This work has described the structure of the natural gas industry and its management in 
Canada, particularly in British Columbia and Alberta, outlining the spectrum of 
government involvement. I have also reviewed how the industry is regulated (one of the 
more prominent policy implementation tools in the natural resource policy arena), how 
regulation came about, and the regulatory structure of the industry at present. It was 
during this review that it became apparent that there is a substantial difference in this 
regulation across the country, particularly in British Columbia. The reason for this 
differentiation can be attributed to the structure of the industry in this province and how it 
developed-almost solely around one company, Westcoast Energy Inc. 
As the industry grew and markets changed, the natural gas policy arena changed from 
one involving a heavily regulated environment to a more market driven environment in 
which taxes and price ceilings were lifted by the federal government and the markets 
were left to work as economics dictate in the gathering and processing sector of the 
industry. This policy transition was particularly noticeable in BC where the structure of 
the industry differed and competition in every sector did not exist. 
Overall the effect of deregulation on the natural gas industry has been a positive one. 
Similarly, Westcoast Energy has benefited from less financial regulation and government 
intervention in the marketing of natural gas. This deregulation of the gathering and 
processing sector had positive results on the company allowing it to compete more 
effectively with regard to price. It was now able to adjust its rates so that it is more 
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competitive with other midstream companies. Prior to deregulation the NEB mandated 
fixed rates on Westcoast, unlike companies that were provincially regulated, giving the 
unregulated companies an unfair advantage. Deregulation was a step toward leveling the 
playing field and extracting Westcoast from the vice of fixed supply contracts on the one 
side and fixed border prices on the other. 
Deregulation also prompted Westcoast to re-engineer the way it did business to more 
effectively meet the demands of the market and focus on its core business-
transportation. In addition to, and as a result of, the marketing changes in the gathering 
and processing sector the pipelines were required to get out of the business of buying and 
selling gas on their own account and become open-access systems. This was relatively 
straight forward for most pipeline companies. However, the implications were quite 
different for Westcoast, again due to its federal regulatory structure. This prompted 
Westcoast to again re-engineer its business practices, this time on the transmission side. 
The result was the Incentive Settlements. 
The combination ofthe deregulation policies to date (the Western Accord, the Agreement 
on Natural Gas Markets and Prices, the Framework for Light-Handed Regulation and the 
Incentive Settlements) have helped W estcoast to reduce costs, have resulted in improved 
customer relations and have helped to level the playing field with respect to equity in 
marketing and pricing relative to other companies in the industry. 
"There is still a substantial discrepancy between West coast and other companies in the 
industry regarding capital expansion (i.e., plants and pipelines)" (anonymous). The 
federal regulatory requirements under the NEB are onerous and cause substantial 
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development delays. The Board's long and complex process for environmental and 
project review greatly diminishes any competitive advantage Westcoast has when 
competing with other companies that fall under provincial regulation, which is a much 
shorter and less rigorous process. 
This federal/provincial jurisdictional difference would also pose significant difficulties if 
competition were introduced into the transmission sector. If pipeline development 
proceeds as anticipated in BC, and those lines are wholly within BC, they will fall under 
provincial jurisdiction and be regulated by the BCUC. This may create differential 
competition due to the Westcoast pipelines being regulated by a different regulator. 
Implications of these results 
It is important to note that the results of this particular case study cannot be generalized 
and be expected to apply to other companies in the natural gas industry. The effect that 
deregulation has had on W estcoast Energy is a result of the unique structure and size of 
the company in the natural gas industry, forcing the resulting regulatory model. It can be 
presumed that if all things are equal in company structure, the same regulatory model 
would result and apply. However the effects of deregulation on Westcoast Energy have 
occurred because of its industry dominance in the province. The resulting changes might 
have looked very different ifWestcoast Energy was an Alberta company where 
competition in all sectors is prevalent. Whether these findings can be generalized with 
respect to theoretical policy implementation is another question. 
It is hoped that this research is useful to colleagues in the field of natural gas 
deregulation, to policymakers, and practitioners. It is also hoped that this research is of 
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interest to those at Westcoast (Duke) Energy and others in the same business and that it 
contributes in some small way to the understanding of the structural and regulatory 
quagmire that makes up the natural gas industry in Canada, particularly in the two 
dominant natural gas producing provinces of British Columbia and Alberta. 
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GLOSSARY OF NATURAL GAS REGULATION TERMS 
Bundled Service 
Bypass 
A service provided by a pipeline or a local distribution company 
which includes the natural gas as well as all the necessary services 
required for a consistent supply (backstopping, load balancing, 
storage). 
The ability of customers (usually industrial) to obtain gas directly 
from a pipeline and thereby circumvent the local distribution 
company. 
Canadian Ownership Special Charge (COSC) 
A federal levy imposed on natural gas and oil to help defray the 
costs of Canadianization of the energy industry. 
Commingling the homogenous mixing of gas from various physical sources. 
Commodity Charge The portion of the cost to transport natural gas on a gathering, 
transmission or distribution system that is variable (i.e., it is a 
per/unit charge that depends on the quantity shipped). 
Contract Demand The maximum volume of natural gas that will either be (a) shipped 
by the gathering/transmission/distribution system or (b) supplied 
by the gas seller. The seller (shipper) is obligated to supply 
(transport) natural gas volumes up to the contract demand volume. 
Cost -{)[-Service A term used in public utility regulation to mean the total number of 
dollars required to cover the LDC's (local distribution company) 
costs (i .e. , revenue requirements). The costs that are included can 
include an amount to cover operation and maintenance expenses 
and other necessary costs such as taxes (income taxes, 
depreciation, depletion and amortization of the property not 
covered by ordinary maintenance. A "fair" return on capital and 
owners' equity is also allowed to ensure that the LDC maintains 
financial integrity, attracts new capital, and compensates the 
owners for the risks involved. 
Distribution System Generally the distribution system consists of mains, service 
connections, and equipment that carry or control the supply of 
natural gas from the inter-provincial or interstate pipeline systems, 
or the point of local supply, to the individual, end users. 
Downstream sector One of three "streams" in the gas development process. The 
downstream sector consists of the large, long-distance natural gas 
transmission pipelines and the local distribution pipelines that take 
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gas directly to consumers. The other two streams are the 
Midstream and Upstream sectors. 
Established Reserves The category of natural gas reserves which have the highest 
probability of being produced. The exact definition used by the 
National Energy Board is: "The reserves recoverable under current 
technology and present and anticipated economic conditions, 
specifically proved by drilling, t3esting, or production, plus that 
judgement portion of contiguous recoverable reserves that is 
interpreted to exist, from geological, geophysical or similar 
information, with reasonable certainty". 
Force Majeure Literally means superior or irresistible force that excuses a failure 
to perform. Force majeure events must not have been reasonably 
foreseeable. This provision is common in natural gas contracts 
because it specifies the effect force majeure will have on the rights 
and obligations of the parties under the contract. 
Gas flaring the burning of surplus combustible vapors 
Incentive Regulation A variety of methods for regulating natural gas pipeline operators 
which have an incentive "bonus" built into them. 
Incremental Tolls 
Marketer 
Midstream Sector 
Open-Access 
Pipeline 
Tolls that are charged on the newly expanded part of a pipeline 
system. This is one method of creating tolls to pay for an 
expansion of a pipeline, the other is Rolled-in Tolls. 
A marketer is either: (i) a part of a natural gas production company 
(or a subsidiary) which sells gas to final consumers or distribution 
companies; or (ii) an independent corporation which purchases gas 
from one or more producers and resells it to final consumers or 
local distribution companies. The second type are also referred to 
as AGGREGATORS. 
One of three "streams" in the gas development process. The 
midstream sector consists primarily of the larger processing 
facilities and the pipelines that tie these fields and processing 
facilities together. The other two streams are the Downstream and 
Upstream sectors. 
A gathering/transmission/distribution system that transports gas on 
a non-discriminatory basis to any party that wishes to contract for 
the gas. 
All parts ofthe physical facility through which gas is moved in 
transportation, including pipe, valves, and other appurtenances 
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attached to the pipe, compressor units, metering stations, regulator 
stations, delivery stations, holders, and fabricated assemblies. 
Postage Stamp Rates A single rate for the entire system; in contrast to zone for mileage 
based rates. 
Rateable take Rateable take means that producers taking gas from the same filed 
agree to take their gas at a particular rate so as to maximize the 
amount of gas that can be recovered from the field and protect the 
integrity of the well which also maximizes the amount of gas that 
can be recovered (B. Jardine email, 2002). 
Removal Permits Removal permits provide authority for natural gas to be removed 
from the province 
Rolled-in Tolls A toll whereby the cost of an expansion is "rolled into" the overall 
costs to operate the pipeline. It is one method of creating tolls for 
an expansion of a pipeline system. 
Royalties Royalties are set by the government on crown lands and are 
negotiated with freehold owners on freehold lands". Companies 
pay the government the value of the natural gas. The value is 
determined by multiplying the "average market price" by the 
royalty (percentage of production) (CERI, section 9, p. 18). 
Seismic surveys Seismic surveys are surveys conducted to obtain detailed 
information from the earth's vibration. This vibration is created by 
discharging explosives in hollow boreholes, or by striking the 
surface with a heavy blow. The nature and velocity of these 
vibrations (as measured by a seismograph) indicate the general 
nature of the section of earth through which the vibrations pass. 
The results of these tests indicate probably oil and gas bearing 
structures (CERI, 1999). 
Spot Market A market characterized by short-term contracts for specified 
volumes of gas. Participants may be producers, marketers, 
brokers, LDCs or end-users. 
Take-or-Pay Clause A clause that requires a minimum quantity of gas to be paid for, 
whether or not the gas is actually taken by the purchaser. 
Transmission System Pipelines that transport natural gas over long distances (usually 
from supply to market regions or to other transmission systems). 
A transmission system usually has a linear configuration, large 
diameter pipe, and they operate at high pressures. 
Unbundled Service The separation of pipeline services into discrete components (e.g., 
transportation, storage, gathering, sales, etc.) Separate fees are 
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charged for each service, based upon only the cost of providing 
that service. 
Upstream Sector One of three "streams" in the gas development process. The 
upstream sector consists of the large and small companies that find 
and develop natural gas reserves and operate gathering pipelines 
and processing plants. The other two streams are the Downstream 
and Midstream sectors. 
Well abandonment Wells that are not in use because they have ceased to produce 
natural gas or because they were dry holes 
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The Western Accord 
(effective June 1, 1985) 
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Ener~y . Mines and 
Resources Canada 
Energ•e. Mines et 
Ressources Canada 
COMMUNIQUE 
!'J/37 
March 28, 1985 
FEDERAL. GOVERNMENT AND PRODUCING PROVINCES ANNOUNCE 
THE WESTERN ACCORD 
OTTAWA - The governments of Canada and the energy-producing 
provinces of Saskatchewan, Alberta and 'British Columbia have reached a 
comprehensive oil and natural gas agreement designed to revitalize the Canadian 
energy industry, Energy, Mines and Resources Minister Pat Carney announced~ -- .-- - - - -- ~-- -. 
The agreement -The Western Accord - calls for the total deru_ulation .of 
Canadian crude oil pricing and marketing, takes steps to make the natural gas 
industry more market-oriented, and eliminates a number of federal oil and gas taxes 
or charges, including the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGR T), the Petroleum 
Compensation Charge (PCC), and the Canadian Ownership Special Charge (COSC). 
"This is truly an important day for Canada," Miss Carney said. "This 
agreement continues the excellent spirit of federal-provincial cooperation which 
began with the election of the Mulroney government 1n September 1984 and continued 
with the signing last month in St. John's of the Atlantic Accord. Today, we take the 
spirit of St. John's one giant step further." 
The federal minister, who reached an agreement with her western 
counterparts earlier this week, said the end to controversial energy taxes, and 
. ---.. ·- - --deregulation -~eginninj_Jun~- ~ ._ J~~'' wlll produce jobs and economic growth 
throughout the country. She added that this Accord fulfils the commitments made by 
the Progressive Conservative Party during the federal election. 
A key element of the Accord will be the deregulation of crude oil prices. 
This will provide an environment which will allow consumers to take advantage of 
decreasing oll prices. These oil prices were frozen at an artificially high level under 
the old administered pricing system. 
-more-
Canada Best Copy possible 
f . 
-2-
A second key element of this Accord is the p~slng out o! the PGR T on 
existing production and its elimination from new production and projects. "This will 
mean large-scale reinvestment in ~ada," Miss Carney added. "And ~der the terms 
of the Western Accord, the federal government and those of the producing provinces 
expect such reinvestment to occur. To ensure that it does, we will be monitoring 
industry performance very carefully." 
Another Important tax measure ln the Accord will permit companies in a 
nonprofit position- which are mainly Canadian -to compete on a more equal 
footing wlth the multinational corporations. They will be allowed to offset unused 
new exploration and development expenditures against the PGRT. In addition, the 
existing $.500 000 small producers' credit .wUI be supplemented by the introduction of ( 
an exemption for individuals of $10 000 of resource income from the PGRT. 
Miss Carney said that Canadian consumers will be protected from the 
volatility of the international markets. If world prices escalate rapidly, or 1! security 
of supply ls threatened, the federal government, in consultation with the producing 
provinces, would·take appropriate measures to protect Canadian Interests. 
For consumers, the Minister said the Western Accord maintains natural 
gas prices at their present level pending the introduction of a new domestic g~ _ 
_l)ricing r~ime which will be !!:!_P_l~c:_~b_y next November. A joint task force of senior 
--· - ·- ·-------·-- . 
government officials will be appointed to work closely with Industry and consumers to 
finalize the new pricing system. 
Miss Carney also said the Petroleum Incentives Program, which provides 
cash incentives to petroleum companies exploring for oil and gas, will be phased out 
by next yea:-. The Government of Canada will consult with the maritime provinces 
and Territorial governments on appropriate royalty incentives to help spur frontier 
petroleum Investment. All outstanding commitments made under PIP will be 
honoured through 'grandfatherlng' provisions. 
For further information contact: 
-30-
Andrew Hutton 
Press Secretary to the Minister 
(613) 993-.52.52 
t_;anaaa 
Be~~ A)L--· I ,~I' /~ 1J..:A ra 1: Saskatche\Yan I ------------------------------------· 
· rl~.~~le 
Western 
Accord 
. all agreement beta'f!en 
the GOlY!nzments of Canada, 
Albe11a, Saskatchewan and 
British Columbia on 
oil and gas pricing and taxation . I 
ENERGY PRICING .A.ND TAX.A.TION UNDERSTANDING 
The Covernments o! Can&d~, Alben~, S&.Skatchewan, and 
British Columbia are asreed en the need to modify the existing taxation and pricing 
regime in orce:- to stimulate investment and job creation in the enersy sector in 
Canada and to increase the cegree of energy security !or &11 Canadians. The four ,. 
Covemmenu furt~er agree that t~ese objectives can best be met within a regime cf 
marke~-sensitive pricing for bot~ oil and ga.s anc within a fiscal regime bued on 
pro!lt-se:uitive taxation. To this end, the !our Governments agree to rer:lac:e 
existin& a.rr~gemcnts covering the pricing and !iscal t:-eument of oil and gas wit!"! 
the provisions set out beiow. These provisions deal resl)ectively wit~: 
I Deregulation of Crude Oil Prices 
11 Domestic !'llatur&l Cas Pricing 
lii Fiscal Pnnc:iples 
. . 
-2-
I DEREGUI.A TION OF CRUDE Oil. PRICES 
IT IS ACREI:.D that market pricing of oil is desirable and. will be implemented 
as follows: · 
1. Fer the purposes cf this underst&rldi!"''g, 'oil' ::1ea.ns crude oil, pentanes plus, 
aynthetic cil and crude bitumen, unless otherwise state~. 
2. Oil m•y be purchased from Cc.n&dian or foreign sources without restrictior~s on 
vctume, and at prices freely negotiated between buyers and sellers, SUbJeCt to 
Cl~uses ' to 9. · 
3. The Covernment o! Cenada agrees, subject to Clauses I and 9, to remove the 
export charges on oil and petroleum proeuc:u, tne Oil Import Compensauon 
Program &nd the Petroleum Compens~tion Cher6e· 
"· Moveme!"'''! of crude oil and petroleum products between provinces, and ~or 
import and export purposes, shall be in accordance with federAl and provinc1~ 
Jegislation est~lishe: tor safety &nC./or environmental reasons. 
'· Concerning the role of the ~ational Energy Soard (NEB): 
1. Consiste!"''t wi:h the move to m"rket pricir.g, voll.:me -.nd price renric:ions 
on short·terrn cn:ce oil anci petroleum proQuct exports wi!l no !cnger be 
required. 
ii. The r\ES will issue non-restrictive licences for short-term exports, on an 
a.!ter-the·!act baSis, to pe!"rnit monitonng o! voh.::-r.es •nc prices. The 
~ES will report monthly to the Mm.LSter of Energy, Mines u.d Re!ources 
en these oil export .matters. Distortions in t~e cornpe-:itive mari<e! or 
particular problems a.ssoc1ated with a tree market wnich are ident:!iec 
t.~rough such monitoring will be addressed by the Minister of E.:1ergy, 
Mines and Resources as they &rise, following consultation with provinc1a! 
governments. 
lii. The NEB will, in appropriate instances, ensure t~t export contacts !or 
periods exceeding one month cont&in force majeure clauses. 
lv. Longer-term exports, of more than one ye&r for light crude &.'"ld petroleum 
producu and two years for heavy crude (as de!ined by the f'iES) ..,.·ul 
continue to require prior approviJ of the NEB Utd the Covernor-in· 
Council. 
v. The NEB's practice of allocating light crude ciJ &mong easte~n Canadian 
refineries will be duccnt.i.nued. 
6. The producing provinces s~l retain their power to control production o! crude 
oil to ensure good conservation practice or, 1n the event of market constrajnu, 
to ensure equi ta.ole shar1ng o! producuon. 
I 
I 
.I 
- 3-
1. Consistent wtth the spirit of c!eregl.!l4tion, the A!!:!'!rta. Petrol~u:-n M~rketing 
Commission wUJ c:use to ~c:t u the exclusive ~ge!'lt !or ~he mari<e:ing of the 
Cro .... ·n lesse-es' share o! crude oil ~nC:: pentanes anc wil!, in iu role as buyer a.nC:: 
aeller of oil in Alberta, be in competition with buY.ers·a.nd seilers of oil in the 
private sector. 
1. ln the event that supplies of crvde ail and petroleum products to Canadian 
consumers are sismficantiy jeopa.rdiz~, the fedenl &overnrr.e!'lt, a.!~e!" 
consultltion wit!'! producing provinces, may restrict ex;:>oru to tr.e ex:en: it 
consicers nec:esn.ry to ens:.:re adec;ua:e suppLies to Canac:ians. 
9. In the event of international oil market distur!)ances that result in sharp 
cnanges to cru~e oil pnc:e.s, .,,dth poten:ial!y negative impac::s on Canac:a, ~ne 
Government of Canlda, !ollow1ng consultati~ns with provinc:;a.l gove:-:-.ments, 
will take A~propriate measu:-es to protect C~~c:ian interests. 
10. These pri:"'C:iples, effec:1ng oil price dere&ulation fer Can~:a, wiJ! c:o:ne into 
effect on June 1, 1 SIS.5. 
n DOMESTIC NATURAL CAS PRlClNC ·. 
IT IS ACREE.D t~t a .more flexible a.nc market-orie:ned pric:~~g :r.ec:~:anis~ is 
re~:.:!:-eo for tl':e c:omes~~c: pr1ci:-:g of nat~o:ra.l gas. It is reccg~i:e: t~at a r.ew cc:-;,es:ic: 
pric1ng regtme tha't is ~~.;na~~e to tr.e produc:ng, t:-ansport!:-.g a.ic: C:is:r~: ... :1:1g 
cornj:lor.ems of the i:-:c:.:s':ry, a.no is ac:c:e?:a:le to j:lrocucing anc censurni;~g ?:-:vi~ces. 
req~.:ires exte:-:si ve cons~.:! ~a t1on .,...i tn tne l..,terested par~!es. To fac;l! tii ~e ::::s 
consu!!.l':ion ~c deveiop a nello' ~arket-se:-:sitive priciilg syste:n it is agreeo '!~at: 
1. The Albe:-ta borcer Frice will remain :.t its prese:-:t levei peno:ng t~. c 
int:-oC:uction o! a ne .... · ccrnest~c n~t:.:ra.l &&.s pric.i;,g reg~:':1e on or tle:::-e 
Novembe:- 1, l9!.5. 
2. A task force o! senior officials !rom the federal govemmen: :..~C: t~e p:-o: .. c::ng 
provmc:es .,...ill '*O:-k wit~ all inte:-es'!ed pa.rt1es, incluC::ng cons~.::-r.ing ~:-ovir.ces 
and incus'!ry, to ceve!op a more Uex1cle marKet-sens1t:ve pnci;,g rnec:.-. .lniS;"!'\ on 
or be! ore :-;ovemcer 1, 1 51&.5. 
3. The subsicy of Tra..,sCanada PipeLines uri!!s unce:- the fe~eral Trans~orta::o~ 
Assutance Program wul be t~~1nated in c:mjunc::ion wi~., t:-~e elirr:;l"'.a:•c:-: of 
the C~adian C~~o·nershtp Spec:Jai Cturge. 
4. The Nat1.:ral Gas !ortarket Incentive Pian unde:- which AJbert.l procuce:-s prov1ce 3 
price discount t~ industrial custome:-s in eastern CanACl will be extence~ !or 
one year u:uil .~pnJ 30, 1986. 
-'· The Market Develapment Incerniv~ Fayme!1ts by the Province of Albe:-ta to e.e 
Government of Canaca .. 111 terminate following payments !or gas C:e!ivere:: up 
to April 30, 19&6, or to ii max1murn level of SloC m11lion in accitional payrr:e~:~. 
whichever comes !irn. 
m FISCAL PRl~CIPLts 
IT IS ACRfED that changes to the ~lsc:al regime !or the petroleum industry are 
neede::: 
to promote industry investment whlc:h ~urt!'lers energy security and 
economic !rowth; and 
to ensure that the producing andunry is taxea on t."e basis o! pro!i ~s 
rather tnanrevenueL 
Consisterit with tr,ese objec:"!ives, it !s agreeo t.'ut the !oUowing rneas.:res w1l! 
be im~lernentea as seen as 1s poss1bie: 
1. The Cove:-nme~t of Ca.nada will remove the 1oUowing taxes or c.~arg~s: t~e 
Natural Ca.s and Ca.s liquids Tax (which inc!udes the N&tur&l G;n Export ~evy ), 
the Incremental Oil Revenue Tax, the Can~d1an Owne:-si':i~ Spec1.1l Cr..lrge, :~e 
Crude Oil Export Charge .:'!C: the Petroleum Compensation Charge. 
2. The Government o! Canae.l will not introduce any spec1al tax on the oil and g.:1s 
producing inc~.:st:-y in order to recover the cefi:it in the fle:roleu~n 
Compennt.ion Ac:ount. 
3. The Petro leu:":": Incentives Program wil! terminate one year f:-or:"' the ca :e of 
announce:ne:-.t ot t:'1is understanding. Notwiti'utancing t!'\is te!"rT.l:":.lt:o:-:, :nere 
w1U be 'granc:fathering' cran&emen:s !or ex1st1ng fx~ioration Ag:-eerr.e:-.ts. 
t;, (&) Fe:- ne.,... proauctio:'\ o~ oil, nat~ral g~s a."lc gas ll(iuids on or c!:er April !, 
19S.S, t~.e ?etro!eum and CQs Revenue Tax will net apply. Furt:-:er, 
subject to f~ce:-•1 &?prov&l, t:"le Pe'!:-ole~.::n a."ld Cas Reven~.:e Tax .,.,.ill not 
&ppiy to n~tural ga5 or oil consurr.ea l:ly or p;oc~.:ced by major r.ew en.e:-gy 
prOJK:S undertaken on or after April 1, 198.5. 
(b) 
(c:) 
The PGR T levied on prior production will be phased out •cc:::orciir:g tc t:"le 
1oUow ing sc:.~~cu!e: 
PER.lOD E.F'F'ECilVE. TAX RATE. (~) 
JN~uary 1/86 - December 31/!6 
J~uary 1/!7 - December 31/!7 
January 1/!8 - December 31/U 
Jltluary 1/89 and thereafter 
Conve:'ltional 
Oil anc Gas 
10.0 
a.o 
6.0 
0 
6.0 
~.0 
2.0 
0 
In addition to the small producer's credit. the first $10 COO o~ an 
individulJ's resource income will not be subJe<:': to the Petroi~um o\l'\d Gas 
Revenue Tax. 
The c:urrent fOR fiscal regime wiU continue: t~ <lpply. 
: 
r. 
; 
'· The parties to t~is unde:-standin~ agree that the phas~-ou~ of the PG:t T l.s 
rec;uired to enh.1nce the producing industry's &::lpability to reinvest in t!-.e 
developme~t of new oil ~nd gas resources !or all C~"''adiar.s. Canac!.ian 
security of supply requires that a hlgh level cf reinvesr.nent occur. The 
federal and produci~g go>ter-nme~u expect such reinvestment will occ:Jr 
and will pursue an active program cf mcnitoring Industry reinv~stme:'lt to 
ensure th4t Canada's energy securi~ objectives are re-ali:.ed. 
6. To assist companies which are not C'.Jrrently paying corporate income tax. 
the Governme:'lt ot Canada will allow ne"" exp!orat1on anc:' deve!O;:lment 
wrtte-of!s which are net immediately usable under the federal corporate 
lncome tax to reduce the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tu otherwtse 
pay:lb!e. The reduction will be calC'.Jlatec as .30 per cen~ o! the unuseo 
amount of write-of!s related to new expenditures in t!'le yea:-. The 
reductions will be applied to PGR T payable on both prcduction income ~nd 
resource royalty income, !or cor;::orations only, and will be taken atter the 
'small proC:ucer creOi t' calc:J~ tion. 
7. The Government o! C&r~ada agrees that tax-based incentives ceslg~ed to 
stimulate investment in Canada's oil and ga..s indus-:ry shall be o! gener:1! 
Applicat ion to t~e industry without discrimination as to the location of :."le 
ACtiVities in question or as to owner3hip and control. 
!. The Governmern o! Canada will ccnsul: with :he mari:ime provinces ar:d 
Territorial governments on applropri.a:e royalty incentives ~ he!? sj:)ur 
frontier petroleum investment. 
9. The ~arties to this understanding agre~ that t.'"le bene!its resulting !ro:":". 
a~oreme~t;c:"'ec cha.r:ges to the tede:-a! tu regime shall flow ::-.ro:Jg:O: to 
the ei! and gas i"'ldustry. The parties a! so agree that any r.e: bene!i:s 
res~l~ing !rom c:-ude oil price decon:roi, ~ determined by ::-.eir respec:;ve 
jurisdictions, shall !low through to the industry. The calc:.:!:~.t;on oi t~e 
net bene!i:s shall taice into account the termination of the cruce ell 
export c:."\arge. 
10. The parties to this understanding reserve the rig!':t. as resource ov.:ners, to 
establish and adjust !rom time to time their royalty and incentive syste~s 
!or the development of oil ano ga.s wit~in thei:- res?ective juris.:ict:~ns. 
Such adju:stments, includi."'lg c.'"langes to APIP, shall be consistent wit~ th~ 
objective ucresse<l &i)ove of !lowt."'lg through to inc:.:stry the net bene'!its 
of the fiscal'anc price aecontrol c:N.nges agreed to herein. 
1 . ... -· 
8ACKCROUNDER 
NATURAL CAS PRIC!NC 
Since 191 .5, the prices cf Alberta natural sa.s soil in Saskatchewa.r:, 
Mani~ob~. Ontario and Quebec: have b~n administered under a&reemenu be~ween the 
&overnmenu o! Canada and Alberta. Curing thi~ pe:-ioc, natural gas · prices were 
linked to crude oil price~. 
From 197.5 to 19! 1 zu prices were set at about " per cent o! c~uce 
price'; from 19!1 to the enC: of 19&4 the relauonship was 6.5 per cent. Howeve~, t!".e 
~tural gas inct.:st~y ~'1d gas consumers ~ve arg~ec: to governmentS that a pricin& 
system that links gas pnces to oi! ~rice' is i~lexib!e, &riC tlut a prici!'lg regime t."la~ 
1s responsive to natural gas market c:ond~tions Is necessary. 
Canada and the producing provinces have now agreed to ceve!oj:), toge-;!1er 
with consuming pro"inces and the natural ga~ industry, a mar~et-responsive pricing 
system to be implemented on or before November 1, 19". The o.bje-::1ve is to allcw 
prices to .be negotiatec be-:ween =uyers anC: seliers of natural gu. 
Inte~im PriCi:"g 
For the interim perioe, Ap~il 1 to November 1, the gover:1:-nen:s o! 
Cana.ca a.nd Alb~u. have a._gree~: to fr~ze the Alberta Borcer Price of gas at i~s 
Curren: 1eve! ot S2.i9 per sig!)O:.Ue. The curre~t wholesale ~~ice o! gas in ea.s~e~:'l 
Ca.naoa is SJ.S6 per gi~<ljouJ.e. Vr'it!'! t!'!e Albe"ta Border Price 1rc:er., anc tne 
elil"!"'lnati:n cf tne Canac1an Ownership Special Cha.:ge on n.nura.l gas (see beiow), ~~e 
curre:n wholesile ~ric:e c! ga.s in e&..stern Canaoa is expectec to d~~ease s.cmewna:. 
Market-Sensitive P~ic::'lz 
For t!'\e Jonger term, govemmenu have agree~ to esta.~hsh a task terce o! 
senior of!ic:iab to adv1se on the implementation o! ~ market.sensitive system !;,r 
n& tural gas pric:ing by November 1 of this year. 
The task force will rely on assistance from representatives o! t!'le gas 
industry from both the producing and consurrung sectors. AJ well, the gove-nrr.en~s c! 
consumin& provinc:s ..,iH be c:onsuJ~ed to assure tnat the1r views are incorporated into 
the new gu pricing system. 
The intention is to establish, on or be! ore November 1, 1 ,s,,· a natural gss 
pricing system that will be responsive to conditionsin 'the marketplace. 
Natural Cas Mark~tin~ lncentiv~ Program 
La \!.c:a l&:n ~l'ldustroiAl matkeu where n~tur:1 G~t f~c:c!: cti!f com;:etitio:'l 
from &lternuive fuels, the governments o! Albe"t& and Canada implemented. ear!y in 
19!4, the f';atural Cas Marketing Incentive Program. Under t!'\is sct:eme, p~ 
producers pay up to SO.JJ per giga]ou!e to encourage load rete~tion and t;,e 
development o! incremental industrial markets east cf Albert&. The govemme~~s 
... .., 
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have a&reed to continue this program !or one more year, until A?:-il 30, 19!&, a~ 
wnic:h time it is expected th~t whatever. incentives arc required to ret~in anc cx;::An~ 
lndustri&l gas m~kets wlll be csta!::lluhed ttvoug.~ buyer-scfler negotia·tloru. 
Trans:lortation Assistance Protram 
In February 1 9!1; the federal government implemented t~e Trans~or:~tion 
Assisunc:e Program (TAP), which reduces the cost of transporting Alberta nu~.:r~ gas 
to e~nern markeu. This program will continue at iU ~resent level o! sc.C'7 ;lCr 
&igajoule until the Canac:!ian 0-.rme!"lhip Special C.~uge (COSC) of SO.ll; per giga;ou!e 
is removed. Vihen the COSC &.nd TAP are elimina:ec:, wholes&Je prices will t~ere:ore 
fAll approximately $0.C1 per gigajoule. 
Under previoi.:S &ireemenn, the federal government administers fo~.:~ 
programs to develop and ex?anc markets for Alberta gas. These programs are func:e~ 
by paymen-:s cut cf we11.~ud revenues eaJled Market Oevelo~rr.e~t lnce!itive 
Payments (MDI?). The ie-:eral government has spent Sl92 million uncer t~ese 
programs, and has made firm commitments to spend ~n acditional SllC milllon over 
t!'\e next two years. Howeve:-, paymen:s to d~te unde: MOI? total only Sl'-2 mi!lio!"', 
leavir.g ~ de~ic1t of Sl60 r:a!llon. The govemme!"'ts of Canada a.r.::l Al!:erta haYe 
agrec-:j t~at t!'le MO!? system ... ·Ul conti!"'ue to April J~, 1986, or u~til t!"'e $160 mll~on 
has b~!"' pa.ic to t!"le C-:>vemme~: of C:.n~c:a, whic:-:eve~ c:=rnes fif"lt. 
Na~'Jral Cas &.!"1~ Cas ticuics Tax (~CCL T) 
The NCGL. T was i!"'troducea in 19!0 en tl'le produc:icn o! ail r.~~:.:raJ ga! 
a!"'d n.u-.:ra1 gas l,jquids, inclu~i!"'g nat:.:n..l gas exporu. The rue anc: :a.se o! t~is t~> 
h~ve c~ange:l a n~.::"i''be:- c! times over ~he iast few years. Because c! ::-:e fo:-:r.uJa, t~e 
C'J!"re!"'t rate sunds .at zero. The Government o! Ca."\aC:a will remove t~is ta> 
entirely. 
8ACKGROUNOER 
FISCAL MEASURES 
1.5/37 (c) 
The energy pricing and taxation agreement between the Cove~nment o! 
CU~aca and the governments of Alberta, !rltish Columbia &nd Saskatchewan will 
provide important benefits to the petroleum industry and to all Canadians. The 
agreeme!"lt will encourage energy security and economic !!'OWth ln Canada by 
st1mulating investment in the oil and gas industry, thereby allowing the industry to 
make its !ull contribution to the eeonomy. Federal Uxation of the pet:-oleum 
industry wUl a.!so be made more profit sensitive. Legislation to implement the agree~ 
fiscal changes will be introduced as soon as possible. 
E.x.l! ting Taxes 
The Covernment of Canada has agreed to remove t!1e !ollowit'lg taxes or 
charges introduced by the previou.s federal government: the Natural Cas a.~C: Cas 
Li~:.:ids Tax, the Inc::-emental Oil Revenue Tax, the Canacian Ownershi!' Special 
Charge, Ex?ort Charges on beth product and crude exporu and the Petroleum 
Compensation Charge. 
Pet-oleum lnc:~tives Program 
The Petroleum Incentives Program (PlP) will con:!rlue for one more yea~ 
until Marc:!1 31, 19!6. PIP will then be terminate: exce't for eligible ex?i:rat~or. 
expenses inc~.:rred in erilling !rontier wells required to sat~sfy exini.~g ccmmit:ne~:s 
related to existing Ex;>Joraticn Agreements on the C£nada Lands. These eligi~le 
frontie:- wells will conti..,ue tc quatify tor PIP cunng a further grandfat~e~~~g pe:-i:::: 
whic!1 will exte:"ld to no later than December 31, 19!7. 
Petroleum and Ca.s Reve1ue Tax (PGRT) 
The current rate of PCRT is U per cent, with an e!!e:~ive rate, after t!'le 
resource allowance whe:-e applicab!e, of 12 per cent on c:onvent1cnal oil and g&s anc 
I per cent (to the end of 1 ~!.5) on synthetic: oll. Approved enhanced oil recovery 
(EOR) projects are able to deduct eJisible capital c:osu against project reve!"lues, thw 
permitting elimination of PCRT until tl'le project attains payout. 
Under the t~ms o! the agre•ment, the PCR T is to be tot&lly eliminated 
by- )anuary 1, 19U. In addition, the PGRT will not apply to approved majo:- new 
energy projects or to any new production of conventional oil, natural gas or naNr~ 
&as liquids brought on stream a!ter April 1, 1 9&5. 
The PCRT will be phased ol.lt for existing prcduc:tion ac:cordlng to the 
following schedule of effective rates: 
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Conv~!"'tional SvT'It!-:et:c 
lanuary 1, 19&6 
lanuary 1, U&7 
January J, 19!! 
J&nuary 1, 1 ?19 
10 
I 
' 0 
(91&) • 
' II 
2 
0 
Under this schedule, the rate of PCRT will be C'.Jt in tw! In about two &1"\d 
a tal! yeus and eliminated a year Ja ter. 
A mere precbe de!inltion and mec~.anisms for administering a PCRT 
exemption for new produc:ion will be worked cut, ln consuJ:ation with the industry 
and producing provinces,_ over the next few weeks. 
lndivi~ual £xem::ltion 
The existing Smail Producers• Cre~it was increued in t..,e Nove!"r.Oe~ ! 
Economic Statement to S.500 000 per year. As a result of this ag:-eeme!"'~, the 
Government of Canada has agreed to further recuce the burden of t.~e PC~ T on 
individuals by making the first SlO 000 of income exe~pt frol"!"' the tax. This will 
mean that an es:i:-r.a.ted t'\l.·o thirds of those incividuals wnc are c::.:rre~tly p&yi:-.g 
PCiR T will no longer be required to do so. 
Enhaneec Oil Reeov~~ Proil!c~s 
The C\.lrrent ECR regi:one will cor.tinue. New enhanced reccvery ;;~o;ec!s 
will have the option of c:urre!'lt EOR regime trea:ment, or new oil treatme~~. as 
described in t."'e a.-.. ~ex to the agreement. 
PC~ T O!fse-:s 
Many smalle:- agg:'euive oil and gu compar.ies are una=le to use :hei~ 
jncome ux write-of!s en a C\Jrrent basis bec3use t~ey do not yet have so.t!!icJe:-:: 
reve!'\ues from production. To assist these types o! firms, wl".ic:h are ty~icaHy sma!le!" 
Can&dian companies, the c.,vernment ct Cenada will &llow new ex~lorat;on and 
development write-oUs, .,hie:.~ are not Immediately · usa:,le uncer the :e:eral 
corporate income ta.x, to be use~ to reduc:e PCiR T ct!'\erwi$e payable. This recu::ion 
•ill be caJcula ted as a nonrefundable credit against t~eir PCiR T, at a rate of 30 pe:-
cent of the unU"Sed write-offs associated with new expenc.itures in tl'le year. 
1n order to minimize acministrative c:cmp!exity and taxpayer burce:-:, t~is 
offset .,ill be voluntary (i.e., taken at the discretion of the tax~aye:-). Use o! th!s 
offset provision will allow the uxpayer tc •cash i."l' his unus~ ex~loraticn anc 
development dedu.:tions. 
These offsets wlll, at least in part anc !or the ne.xt few years, serve as a 
replacement for PIP for those companies which cannot tully use income t~x write-
o!fs. · 
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Nondlsc:r im l.na tory Il"'c:entives 
Any new tax-based federal Incentives designed to stimulate oil and gas 
Industry Investment will be nondiscriminatory in ~erms of location and ownership. 
Thb u not intended, however, to prohibit present or future ~ax measures of general 
application to &lllndustries such as the Investment Tax Credit. N~lther is Jt intenced 
to prevent the introduction of spec:lfic Incentives urgetted at particuar forms of 
hlgh-<:ost production. 
Can.ad~ Lands Ron!ties 
In vJew of the major fiscal changes such as PIP and PCR T ellmina tion t~at 
are part of this agreement. the Government of Canaca will consult wit!"! the 
sovernments of interestec provinces and territories to m~ify the c~~da Lanes 
royalty regime in such a way as to help mainuin &n appropriate JeveJ of ~etro!e:.:m 
cxplora tion and developm~t activity. Possible roy&Jty mOdi!icaticns to be exz.mmed 
include hoJiQys, rate reduction and revised structures. 
Industry Rein't"eS'tment 
The Covernmen: of Canada Ms agreed to make substantial pricing anc 
flscaJ changes in order to provide additional funds for industry reinvestment. A high 
JeveJ of investment is essential to ensure sec:-.Jrity of energy supply for C&nadians anc 
to create more jobs. Based on historical ·industry performance and ex:ensive 
discussion with the indust~y, it is _expected that all of t~e aaditior:al cas:"\ flo ·.ws 
generated by the measures announced today will be reinveste~. 
To ensure t.'"lat hl~h levels o! reinvestment take ~lace, t~.e parties to t!"'e 
agreement will be actively morutoring industry behaviour. For its part, tt.e 
Government of Canada will instruct the Petroleum Monitoring Age!"'cy to pursue a 
more intensive program of morutoring industry investment behaviour. 
The governments have agreed that each of t:"le producing provinces vdll 
1low through to the oil ltld ga.s industry t~e net benefits t~at migr'lt otherwise be 
received a.s provincial revenues resultin& !rom the following oanges: 1 
- crude oil price decontrol; ~ 
pha.se-out ltld removal of federal taxes; 
introduction of feeeral 'of bets' against PCR T; and 
remov&J of federal and Alberta PIP. 
. The estimatjon of these net benefits will be determined by eac~ provincial 
&overnment 1or iu respective jurisdiction. 
Any changes In provincial royaJtjes or incentives will remain completely 
within the jurisdiC'tion of eac." province but will be consistent witl'l the agreed 
principle ot flow-through of net benetiu from the changes ou~Hned above. 
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BACKCROUNDER 
CRUDE Olt PRICE OER.EGUt.A.TTO~ 
Canada h.&s l'lad a ayst~m o! administered oll prices since September, 
1973. Under this system, the c!omenic price of crude oil has beert maintained below 
its inter~tlonal market value. This s~tem is now being cismantled. 
From June l, 19!,, producers of oil will negotiate s&.Jes contracts directly 
with crude oil purchasers and the market will determine the price of oil. 
Witl'l deregul~tion, buyers of crude will have access to a choice of sources 
to benefit consumers. f.qui.Hy, producers will have access to ~!!erent outlets f:>r 
their crude. 
The system now bein~ dismantled began in 1973 with the freezing of 
domestic: prices of &ll crude oil. In order to attract investment in new sup~lies of oil, 
'new oil' was granted irnerna tional prices. ThiJ wu first applied in 1978 to 
production from the Syncrude synt!'letic oil plant at Mildred Lake, Alberta, and late:" 
to output of synthetic: oil !rom t."le Suncor plant. Then, from January U82, it apj.)iied 
to oil discovered a!ter December 31, 1911. Gradually, the c:ate~ories of quali!ying oil 
were expanced to induce oil discovered !rom 197~ throug!'l 19! 1. 
To deliver t~ese special pricing arrangements, complex sove-:-:"lme:'lt-
administered programs were added to the oil import compenution system nar-:eo in 
1 '37 4. 
The administe!'e<f oil pricing system has reached the point in 19S5 where 
more tl'\&1'1 50 per cent o! t~e oil produced in Canada rece:ves the interna:;onal pw:e. 
Including imports, more than 80 per cent of oil CQt'lsumec ir. C~aca receives so:-ne 
form of compensation. The res'Jl:ing system o! levies. taxes a.nd reg· .. l!attor.s !".as 
imposed serious restrictions on pet~ieum tN.rl<ets. The system has mn;~ite~ t~e 
petroieum indust:-y ln meeun~ iU full potenti~ !or creating jobs a.~C: stimula:mg 
economic: renewal. 
Also in 197.3, controls were imposed on oil exports to reflec:~ t~e 
requirements of the domes-:ic price control regime and to address internu:ona.l oil 
mari<et developments. Ali oil exports were su~jeet to licence, issued by the r-.;a:io~al 
fnergy Board, impostng volume, ;n-ic:e and other restrictions on the te:-ms of expo:-t 
contracts. Export c:."'arges were levied to make up the cfi!!erence between controlled 
domestic prices &."''d those available in export markets. 
An improved internatioMJ oil sup~ly environment, fal!ing Canacian 
consumption, srowing western productive capacity and the increastng cost to the 
economy o! requiring industry to hold back output, has resulted in some rela.xa.tton of 
export controls over the last few years. Currently, Canada exports i.p?roximately 
2' thousand c:ubic metres (1!0 000 barrels) per day cf light crude and '-2 t!'lousand 
cubic metres (2" 000 barrels) per day o1 heavy crude. Nevertheless, the system oi 
expert dlarges and licences remained in place, with ne~ative consequences both for 
the petroleum industry and the economy. 
fxport char&in& and licensin& provided a disincentive to the deve!opme!'lt 
of export markets for C&r~adian oil by industry. Furthermore, because CanadHlt'l oil is 
subject to covernment controls rather than strictJy commercial considentions, it h&5 
tended to sell at a discount in foreign markets. This factor, combined wir!'l 
administered domestic crude oil prices, has cenerated serious pricing anomalies. 
Recently, Can•dian crude oil has had to be exported at prices substa..ntiaJly below 
those paid by domestic refineries. . 
Canada - inoeeC:: the world - ls in a different position in U!.5 than it was 
a decade ago with respect to energy SK'\Jrlty. International and national mechanisms 
for emergency preparedness have been created. Productive capacity exceeas 
demand. fner&,y alternatives abound. If international oil market disturbances cause 
sh~rp c:han!es in crude oil prices, ,...hic!-1 could h~ve a nesative impact en Canada, the 
federal &cvernment ... m take appropriate measures to protect Canadian interests 
alter consulting with provincial &overnments. 
Freed from uMecessary zovernment controls, the oil industry can fitld 
new reserves of conventional oil, and develop and upgraoe the vast resources of heavy 
c:Nde oil and bitumen. But ;this cannot be done at controlled prices. And, it cannot 
be done by sovernments restricting market access. ~-
With deregulation the NEB will no longer determine the prices of exported 
oil. Nor will the NEB require prior approval ot light crude and oil product export 
contr~cu of Jess than one year and heavy crude oil export contracts of less than two 
years. However, the board wlll continue to monitor these exports and report to the 
Minister of Energy, Mines ~nd Resources on a monthly b•sis. Exports of a longer 
duration ,...ill not be possible without zovernment approval. The sovernment will 
continue to monitor volumes and prices to ensure its awareness of events in the 
marketplace that could pose warning signs to the C~nadi~n economy. 
The above measures en oil exports and domestic: pricing will mean several 
significant changes to the petroleum industry in Cana~. These are summarized in 
the a tt~ched table. 
~troleum Com~tion 
~r~te {Pee) 
~troleum Levv Offset 
ogram (PLOP) for Petre> 
i'lemJc.al PrOducers 
timarv industry Levv 
rtset Pro~r~m 
ontrolled Prices on 
ocwentiona.J Old Oil 
~ OOP) 
·~ew Oil Reference Price 
~ORP) tor Synthetic: 
1rude Oil 
-l-
Old Administer~ Svtem 
- All domestic: and forei!n c:ruce oil 
and Imported petroleum products 
consumed in CM~ada bore the PCC, 
current!/ at $¥1.1,. per c:ubic: metre. 
- ~xports of products were eligible 
for rebates of the PCC. 
• . The last increase in the Petroleum 
Compensation C~arge was Sl7.SO 
per c:ubic: metre on November 10, 
191/1 (as announced in the Economic 
Statement of November a, 1 "">· 
- PLOP provides an offset against 
that increase for certa:n pnmary 
petrochemical products. 
- As part of the Fue1 Tax Rebate 
Program t~ose in primary industnes 
Uumers, 1ishe:-men, ana those 
involved in logging, mining, hunting 
and trapj'in~) are eligi!:lle tor a l.~c 
per litre PCC rebate. 
- The price of oil disc:ov~ed prior to 
1974 is controlled by agreement 
with t."\e provinces at below worid 
JeveJs. 
- About '' per cent of domestic oills 
aUeeted. 
- Producers of aynthetic . crude 
ehgible for the intern& tional pric:e 
and receive compensation based on 
a complex caJOJi&tion similar to 
that employed for conventlonaJ new 
oiJ. 
.- No longer l:nposed. 
- Program er1es witM 
elim1:'1aticn o! PCC. 
• The l.!c j)e~ !ltre PCC 
re!la te enc:s wr:~ 
e!imi~at;on o! ?CC. 
- The .3.Cc per ll t~e 
Feoe~al Saies Tax 
reb& te c:o~ :;nues. 
- Producers sell t!'\eir oi~ 
at market ;>rice. 
- Refiners pay marl<e1 
priee. 
- Ciove:-nment d~es no· 
set the pric:e. 
- Price set by mar 
ketplac:e. not b 
government. . 
- No c:ompensat10 
required. 
New OU R.e!erenee Prlc:e 
~ORP) for Conventional 
' rode 011 
Oil Imoort Co~oen.sation 
Program (OlCP) 
Domestic Transfer 
Ccm pe..,!.l tl on 
Cruae Oil E.x~ Charge 
-.,.-
- Producers of qualifying new oil in 
five producin& provinces and the 
territories are J'&id compensation 
for dlUerencc: between lntern.tional 
price and controlled domestlc price. 
• Compensation based en 11 dl!ferent 
NORP prices c:alc:ulated from prices 
of '4 foreign c:ru~es at Montreal, 
subj~t ~o detailed federal-
provin_cial administrative manuaJ. 
- Paymenu made 10 oil lm;:>orters 
based on the difference between the 
average cost of foreign and 
equivalent-q\Ulity ~adi&n c:rude 
oil at Montreal. 
- To protect markets for Canadian 
production, access to irnerr:atio:'lal 
· m~orket wu restricted. 
- Com~ensuion grantee !or c:osu of 
movir.g c::~mestlc crude to re!i:'leries 
east of Montreal. 
• A . charge is recommended by the 
Na:ional Energy Soard on all 
exporte:i cr.Jde oil and petroleum 
products. The level is equal to the 
dif!erence between the selling price 
and the Jower Canadian-controlled 
price. 
- Export charge revenues on crude ell 
split .50-'0 with the province of 
producticn. 
• The revenues on products . accrued 
entirely to the federal government. 
• Procuc:ers sell their c 
. at market price. 
l"-• Refiners pay mark• 
price. 
- Government does n< 
set the pric:e or pi 
any c:omj)ensation. 
• No Import c:ompens 
tion necessary. 
- No res-:ric:1ons < 
imports. 
- Sud': moveme~:s v. 
be on a co:nme~= 
basis. 
- Expor~ 
elimina tee. 
y 
' 4 .. 
Crude Oil ;.xport ticen~s 
• 
Imoort tleences 
.... -
Old Administere-d Svst~m 
NEB l.icence required for all cn.~~e 
oU er,:lorts and for most petroleum 
products. 
• NEB licences required en imports o! 
heavy f:.~el oil. 
Mar\(et Svstem 
- Monitoring o! export 
wili c:cn~i!'lue but pri= 
approval ~ill not C• 
!- re<;uired fer CXplOrts 0 
Jlgl'lt crude oil anc 
petroleum product: 
less than one ye~r, anc 
heavy c:ruce less t~i.r 
two years, in dur~:ior:. 
- No Jice:1c:es requi:-ed. 
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OTTAWA - Canada will move from government-administered prices to a 
market-oriented regime for both domestic and exported natural gas during the next year 
with immediate benefits to both consumers and producers, the Honourable Pat Carney, 
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, announced today. 
An agreement between the federal government and the gas-producing 
provinces of Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan, which takes effect November 1, 
1985, will mean lower prices for consumers and improved market access for producers. 
During a one-year transition period the benchmark Alberta Border and Toronto 
Wholesale Prices are frozen at existing levels. 
Residential consumers will pay lower gas costs this winter than last as they 
benefit by at least 8 cents per gigajoule from the removal of the Canadian Ownership 
Special Charge resulting from the Western Accord. 
Domestic consumers will not pay the TransCanada PipeLines {TCPL) toJJ 
increases recently approved by the National Energy Board (NEB) totalling approximately 
11 cents per gigajoule and due to be applied November 1. Under the agreement, the toll 
increases are to be absorbed by producers. In return, producers wiJJ have improved access 
to export markets. 
During the transition year, customers whose contracts expire wiJJ be free to 
negotiate new contracts directly with producers at competitive prices provided a 
transportation toll service is in place. About 60 per cent of industrial contracts will 
expire during the year and will be able to benefit from this provision. AJJ customers will 
be able to renegotiate existing contracts during the transition period providing aJJ parties 
agree. 
"By November 1, 1986, all natural gas buyers and sellers in Canada will be 
released from unnecessary government intervention in their market place," Miss Carney 
said. "In the transition period, the ability to voluntarily renegotiate contracts and to 
-more-
Canada 
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increase exports will create and preserve jobs. The agreement is an excellent example of 
balanced regional compromise in the national interest." 
The agreement provides for: 
direct sales at prices and terms freely negotiated between producers and 
distributors or large industrial users, provided transportation service is 
made available by consumer provinces' regulatory bodies; 
com?etitive marketing programs under which distributors will be permitted 
to offer discounts to meet competition;-
export floor prices based on regional price tests rather than a single 
Toronto price; 
an NEB review of TCPL's services in light of the new pricing system to 
ensure equitable access to this system; 
removal of volume restrictions on short-term natural gas exports; 
a comprehensive review of the role and operations of interprovincial and 
international pipelines. 
Equitable access will be provided for British Columbia gas through the Alberta 
pipeline system to new markets in both the U.S. and eastern Canada. 
The agreement anticipates that consuming provinces, through their regulatory V 
bodies, will ensure provisions of the agreement flow through to consumers so that they 
can take advantage of opportunities for market pricing. 
The agreement also anticipates that NEB and provincial regulatory agency 
reviews of surplus tests for natural gas exports will result in significantly freer access to v 
domestic and export markets. 
Although producing provinces retain the right to control removal of natural 
gas from their provinces, they have agreed not to use this power to frustrate the intent of 
the agreement on natural gas. 
"The agreement completes the process begun in the Western Accord of 
replacing prices set by government with prices set by the market," Miss Carney said. "All 
Canadians will benefit." 
- 30-
For further information, please contact: Andrew Hutton 
Press Secretary to the Minister 
(613) 993-5252 
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BACKGROUNDER 
IMPORTANCE OF NATURAL GAS 
Natural gas is one of Canada's great energy strengths. Canada is 
fortunate to have this fuel in abundant supply. Already approximately 3 million 
householders enjoy the advantages of natural gas heating. Natural gas is also a 
source of energy a·nd a raw material for our major industries across the country and is 
developing as a transportation fuel of the future. It is also a major source of export 
earnings contributing $4 billion to Canada's trade surplus, and an important 
contributor to economic activity. 
HISTORY 
Domestic Gas Pricing 
Prior to November 1975, the price for natural gas in interprovincial trade 
was determined by . negotiation between producers and TransCanada PipeLines 
(TCPL). TCPL was the sole purchaser and carrier of gas into interprovincial markets 
east of Alberta. It sold its gas to provincial distributors at the city-gate at 
negotiated prices. The trans ortation component of the ric been re ula~p,,__ 
the National Energy oard. 
' I he passmg of the Petroleum Administration Act in 197.5 provided for the 
federal prescription of city-gate prices and led to the negotiation of the first 
Canada/ Alberta Gas Pricing Agreement effective November 1, 1975. Since 1975, the 
prices of Alberta natural gas sold in interprovincial trade have been administered 
under agreements between the governments of Canada and Alberta. During this 
period, natural gas prices were linked to crude oil prices. 
Export Gas Pricing 
Since 1975 export prices were set by the federal government. On 
November 1, 1984, the Government of Canada revised its export pricing policy to 
allow Canadian companies to export gas to U.S. buyers at negotiated prices. The 
policy also made provisions for short-term exports of natural gas by order subject to 
volume limitations. 
In response to the policy changes of November 1984, Canada's natural gas 
exports increased by more than 23 per cent from the previous year. Export revenues 
from natural gas have been maintained despite severe downward pressure on prices in 
the United States. Export revenues for the period from November 1, 1984 to 
September 30, 1985 were $Can 3 696 million compared with $Can 3 674 million in the 
same period last year. 
The Western Accord 
Among its other elements, the Western Accord of March 28, 1985 
committed Canada and the producing provinces to develop by November 1, 1985 a 
new market-responsive pricin~s.~em for domestic pricing of natural gaL,in 
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interprovincial trade. To develop this mechanism, a task force of senior officials 
from the federal government and the producing provinces was struck to work with all 
interested parties, including consuming provinces and industry. 
A natural gas "summit group", including representatives of the Canadian 
Gas Association, the Canadian Petroleum Association, the Independent Petroleum 
Association of Canada and the Ontario Natural Gas Association, provided a forum for 
dialogue among organizations from the production, transmission and distribution 
sectors of the natural gas industry. The issues identified by the Summit have been 
used as a basis for discussion between the federal government and the producing 
provinces. 
OBJECTIVES OF AGREEMENT 
The agreement among participating governments is intended to create the 
conditions for a new market-responsive pricing system consistent with the regulated 
Cflaracter of tf'ie transmlSSlOn and dtstnbutwn sectors or the as= mdustr • It stgnafs 
an en o ernment administered prtces an a return to market forces 
characterized by choices for buyers and sellers. While the agreement provides for a 
transition period of one year, access will be immediately enhanced for Canadian 
buyers to natural gas supplies and for Canadian producers to natural gas markets. 
The new regime will provide the framework for negotiated prices between 
buyers and sellers. Prices will be affected by conditions in the marketplace; both 
supply and demand will influence the price. Competition will be fostered which 
should increase the industry's ability to react quickly to changing conditions. 
TERMS OF AGREEMENT 
Interim Prices 
For a transition period, from November 1, 1985 to July 31, 1986, the 
gov~rnments have agreed to freeze the Alberta Border Price (ABP) of gas for existing 
contracts at $2.79 per gigajoule (GJ) ($2.9¢ per Mcf). The governments have further 
agreed to freeze the Toronto Wholesale Price (TWP) at its current level of $3.79/GJ. 
Consumers will not be asked to absorb the increase of 11.2¢/GJ in TCPL 
tolls due to take effect November 1, 1985. A new Transportation Assistance Program 
(TAP II) will accommodate the TCPL toll increase for all domestic zones and for all 
domestic TCPL services. The cost of the program will be funded from revenues 
provided by the Government of Alberta. 
As a result of the TAP II initiative by governments and of the June 1, 
1985 elimination of the Canadian Ownership Special Charge (COSC), which was 
effectively 8 cents per gigajoule. Canadians will enjoy lower natural gas costs this 
winter. 
Direct Sales and Competitive Marketing Programs 
After November 1, 1985, gas customers will be able to enter into supply 
contracts with gas producers (direct sales) at negotiated prices for new contracts or 
as their existing contracts expire. 
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Such arrangements will be possible as soon as regulatory agencies provide · 
for availability of access to the distribution systems (contract carriage). As well, 
consumers who choose to renegotiate their contracts during the transition period may 
do so with the agreement of producers supplying the gas. -
Provisions will be made for competitive marketing programs (CMPs), 
beginning November 1, whereby producers selling system gas can offer discounts to 
meet competitive situations in the marketplace. 
Canada, Alberta and the consuming provinces will exclude the volume 
associated with direct sales and CMPs from eligibility for the Natural Gas Market 
Incentive Program. This program is due to expire April 30, 1986. However, direct 
sales and CMPs volumes will qualify to earn the export flowback revenue, until this 
system expires November 1, 1986. · 
New Sales to Distributors 
Effective~ immediately, and subject to the prov1s1on of contract 
carriage, a distributor may enter into direct purchase arrangements at negotiated 
prices for volumes of natural gas which are incremental to the quantity of gas 
committed under existing or renegotiated contracts. 
Existing Sales to Distributors (System Gas) 
Beginning November 1, 1986, the prices of all natural gas in . 
interprovincial trade will be determined by negotiation between buyers and sellers. 
-¥ Parties to existing contracts may in good faith and on a voluntary basis 
negotitate for both price and volume provisions. 
Exports 
Export Pricing Policy 
To provide for more open access to export markets by Canadian 
producers, Canada will amend its export pricing policy with respect to the 
relationship between domestic and export prices for natural gas. The Toronto 
Wholesale Price floor for all exports will be replaced with a regional reference price 
criterion. This will ensure that any Canadian gas sold to the United States will not be 
priced lower than gas sold to Canadians for similar types of service in the area 
nearest the export point. 
Export Market Access 
To provide more open access by Canadian producers to export markets, 
Canada wiJJ amend its regulations to allow the export of natural gas by order without 
volume limitation for terms not exceeding 24 months. 
Export Surplus Tests 
The participating governments anticipate that the reviews of surplus tests 
currently underway by the NEB and soon to be initiated in provincial jurisdictions will 
result in significantly freer access for producers to domestic and export markets. 
Gas Imports 
There is prov1s1on for the import of natural gas in the National Energy 
Board Act and Regulations. 
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GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS 
To facilitate direct sales and CMPs the governments of Canada and 
Alberta will amend price legislation and regulations affecting natural gas trade in the 
transition period. Additionally, Alberta agrees to amend its Arbitration Act and 
review its removal permit process to ensure these are consistent with the overall 
intent of the Agreement. Canada will undertake to ensure that direct sales have 
equitable and open access to TCPL transmission facilities. 
The Government of Canada will ask the NEB to review the pertinent 
issues regarding access to TCPL's transmission facilities. 
PIPELINE REVIEW 
The Western Accord governments agreed to initiate a comprehensive 
review of the role and the operation of pipelines engaged in the buying, selling and 
transmission of gas in interprovincial and international markets. 
·. 
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GLOSSARY 
Alberta Arbitration Act: Provincial legislation providing the terms and conditions for 
contract arbitration, including pricing provisions, in gas purchase contracts. 
* Alberta Border Price (ABP): The price, expressed in dollars per gigajoule (GJ), at 
which natural gas leaves the province of Alberta for domestic markets. 
Canadian Ownership Special Charge (COSC): A federal levy imposed on natural gas 
and oil to help defray the costs of Canadianization of the energy industry. 
City-Gate. Price: Price distributors pay for TCPL's gas (Alberta Border Price) plus 
the relevant transportation toils. 
~ Competitive Marketing Programs (CMP): Mechanism which allows distributors 
currently selling system gas to offer discounts on certain volumes to meet 
competition in the marketplace. 
Commodity Charge: The variable component of pipeline transportation tolls designed 
to recover the varia~s of delivered gas. 
Contract Carriage: Transportation service provided under contract to transport gas 
not owned by the pipeline company. 
t- Demand Charge: The ~ component of pipeline transportation toils designed to 
recover the fixed costs related to pipeline service. 
Direct Sales: Natural gas supply purchase arrangements transacted between 
producers, including marketers, and end-users at negotiated prices for which 
pipeline charges must be contracted separately. 
Export licence: A licence issued by the National Energy Board for a long-term (in 
excess of two years) export of gas. 
Export order: An order issued by the National Energy Board for short-term (up to 
two years) export of gas. 
Flowback: Revenues received from exports of Alberta-produced gas in excess of 
those that would have been received for similar sales in Canada. 
Gigajoule: A measure of the energy content of a fuel; a typical residential consumer 
of natural gas might use about 1.30 gigajoules (GJ) per year for household 
heating. (One gigajoule equals .95 Mcf.) 
Incremental Gas: Demand for gas in addition to that already supplied to a market 
area or which would be lost under existing supply conditions. 
Market Development Incentive Payments (MDIP): Payments made by the 
Government of Alberta to the Government of Canada created to fund programs 
designed to facilitate the expansion of domestic gas markets for Alberta-
produced gas. 
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Natural Gas Markets Incentive Program (NGMIP): An incentive plan for Alberta 
natural gas sold to large-volume users, primarily industrial, in Manitoba, 
Ontario and Quebec. The program went into effect on May 1, 1984 and wi11 end 
on April 30, 1986. The plan provides for rebate of up to $0.35/GJ on eligible 
volumes. 
Regional Reference Price: A criterion by which the National Energy Board will 
assess export prices at the international border to ensure that domestic 
consumers do not pay more for Canadian gas than their U.S. neighbours. 
Removal Permit/Certificate: A permit granted by a provincial government 
authorizing the removal from Alberta of natural gas or from the province of 
production. 
Spot Sales: Short-term sale of natural gas generally on a best-efforts and 
interruptible basis. 
Surplus Tests: The criteria established by provincial or federal regulations to 
determine the quantity of gas which may be surplus to the reasonably 
foreseeable provincial or Canadian requirements and therefore available for 
sale in interprovincial and international markets. 
Take-Or-Pay (TOP): Gas supply contracts usually contain prov1s1ons that gas 
contracted for, but not taken, will be paid for. Weaker than expected demand 
for natural gas in .the late 1970s and early 1980s Jed to large payments being 
made by pipeline companies to producers for gas not taken. 
TOPGAS: A banking consortium was formed in 1982 to refinance the take-or-pay 
payments made by TransCanada PipeLines to producers for $2.7 billion dollars 
of gas. The refinancing is referred to as the TOPGAS loan, and the interest on 
this loan is paid by TCPL gas producers. 
TOPGAS Charges: The interest on the TOPGAS Joan is paid by gas producers. 
Toronto Wholesale Price (TWP): The cost of natural gas for resale by distributors in 
TransCanada PipeLine's (TCPL) eastern delivery zone equal to the sum of the 
Alberta Border Price and the TCPL transportation toll. 
Transportation Assistance Program (TAP): A federal government subsidy program 
initiated February 1, 1984 to reduce the impact of rising gas transportation 
tolls. 
;t T -service: The gas transportation tariff offered by a pipeline company or distributor 
to transport gas owned by others. See also contract carriage. 
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AGREEMENT AMONG THE GOVERNMENTS 
OF CANADA, ALBERTA, BRITISH COLUMBIA AND SASKATCHEWAN 
ON NATURAL GAS MARKETS AND PRICES 
INTENT 
1. In the Western Accord of March 28, 19&5 on Energy Pricing and Taxation, the 
governments of Canada, Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan agreed 
that a more flexible and market-oriented pricing regime was required for the 
domestic pricing of natural gas. -The present Agreement is intended to create 
the conditions for such a regime, including an orderly transition which is fair to 
consumers and producers and which will enhance the possibilities for price and 
other terms to be freely negotiated between buyers and sellers. This will have 
favourable effects on investment, employment and trade and will provide 
energy security for all Canadians. 
PRINCIPLES 
3. The twelve month period commencing November 1, 19&5 is the transition to a 
fully market sensitive pricing regime. While prices will continue to be 
prescribed by governments, immediate steps will be taken to enable gas 
consumers to enter into supply arrangements with gas producers at negotiated 
prices (direct sales), which prices will then promptly be endorsed by 
governments in the context _of the administered system. After this transition 
period, purchase and sale of natural gas will be freely negotiated, and prices 
will no longer be prescribed. 
4. It is the intention of the parties to the Agreement to foster a compet1t1ve 
market for natural gas in Canada, consistent with the regulated character of 
the transmission and distribution sectors of the gas industry. In this regard the 
governments commit, without qualification, that once the transition to the new 
marketing and pricing system is completed, the system will stay in place for the 
foreseeable future. 
DOMESTIC NATURAL GAS SALES 
A. Direct Sales and Competitive Market Programs 
5. Effective November 1, . 19&5, consumers may purchase natural gas from 
producers at negotiated prices, either directly or under buy-sell arrangements 
with distributors, provided distributor contract carriage arrangements are 
available in respect of such purchases. This provision is in no sense intended to 
interfere with provincial jurisdiction in regard to regulation of gas distribution 
utilities. 
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6. For the period November 1, 1985 to October 31, 1986 consumers who seek 
release from existing contractual arrangements with distributors shall be 
eligible to purchase natural gas from producers at negotiated prices, as 
described in paragraph 5 above, only where the producers supplying the gas_ ;..,~T 1 . 
under the existing contractual arrangements have agreed to such release. ._ .,-+.r ~ ~ ' 
'> ·\ J>•t 
7. To enable the market-responsive pricing system to operate within the intent of 
this Agreement, the governments request the National Energy Board to review 
the foJJowing concerns: 
il) 
w:1ether inappropriate duplication of demand charges will result from 
possible displacement of one volume of gas by another; and 
whether the policy regarding the availability of T -Service, as outlined in 
the Board's latest TransCanada PipeLines toll decision is still appropriate, 
taking into account, among other things, interested parties' views on the 
fair and equitable sharing of take-or-pay charges. 
8. Effective November 1, 1985, competitive marketing programs (CMP) to meet 
special market requirements may be negotiated between distributors, shippers 
and the producers who are providing the natural gas volumes associated with 
such programs. 
9. A consumer purchasing natural gas under a direct sale or a competitive 
marketing program must waive eligibility for payments under the Natural Gas 
Market Incentive Program (NGMIP), for those volumes taken under the direct 
sale or CMP. 
B. New Sales to Distributors 
10. Effective November 1, 1985, a distributor may under new or renegotiated 
contracts, purchase natural gas from shippers or directly from producers at 
negotiated prices. Notwithstanding such an arrangement, prior to November 1, 
1986, the distributor shall take the full volumes of gas committed under 
existing contracts before accepting the delivery of any volumes of gas under a 
new contract. 
C. Existing Sales to Distributors 
11. The price of gas delivered under existing shipper-distributor contracts shall 
remain at $2.79804 per gigajoule at the Alberta border for the period 
November 1, 1985 to October 31, 1986. 
12. The National Energy Board has approved for implementation November 1, !985, 
an increase in TransCanada PipeLines' (TCPL) transportation tolls. In order to 
maintain the Alberta Border Price and the Toronto Wholesale Price at their 
current levels, and to allow TCPL to recover its approved costs for the 
transportation of natural gas consumed in domestic markets, the Government of 
Canada agrees to pay an amount equal to the value of revenues foregone over 
13. 
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the period November 1, 1985 to October 31, 1986. These payments will be 
made under a Transportation Assistance Program financed by an extension of 
the Market Development Incentive Program (MDIP) to October .31, 1986. 
Prior to November 1, 1986, negotiations shaJJ commence between distributors, 
shippers and the producers supplying the gas in question respecting the price to 
be paid for natural gas delivered under existing contracts. Prices resulting 
from such negotiations shall come into effect November 1, 1986 and as agreed 
thereafter. Where contract renegotiation between buyers and seJJers, whether 
of price or volume, takes place in good faith and on a voluntary basis, 
governments will not obstruct the resulting commercial transactions. 
14. In the absence of an Agreement between a shipper and a distributor, or a 
producer and a shipper, on the price to be paid for gas under existing contracts 
on November 1, 1986, and thereafter, the price shaJJ be determined through 
arbitration. 
15. With respect to gas produced in Alberta, the Government of Alberta intends to 
amend the Arbitration Act. The amendment would enable pricing disputes 
between producers and purchasers to be arbitrated under the act or under 
alternative arrangements established by contract between the parties. The 
amendments wiJJ ensure that the arbitration of pricing disputes is done in an 
impartial and equitable manner consistent with the policy of implementing a 
more market-responsive domestic gas pricing system. SpecificaJJy, the 
Government of Alberta commits to amend Section 17 of the act to permit the 
arbitrator to take into account all relevant factors required to arrive at a fair 
decision on the price of the natural gas in question. 
EXPORT NATURAL GAS SALES 
16. The governments anticipate that reviews of surplus tests underway or shortly to 
be initiated by the National . Energy Board and by the appropriate provincial 
authorities will result in significantly freer access to domestic and export 
markets and thus will contribute to the achievement of the market-oriented 
pricing system contemplated in this Agreement. 
17. Effective November 1, 1985, the Government of Canada will take appropriate 
steps to amend its existing policy on short term export sales of natural gas. 
Specifica!Jy: 
i) the "incrementali ty test" shaJJ be eliminated; 
ii} the "competing fuels test" shall be eliminated; and 
iii) the Na tiona! Energy Board VI Regulations, Section 8 shall be amended to 
aJJow the export of natural gas by order without volume limitation for 
terms not exceeding 24 months. 
18. Effective November l, 1985, the Government of Canada will amend its policy in 
regard to the conditions exporters of natural gas must meet for gas exported 
under licence. To obtain approval, all licence holders must demonstrate that 
their negotiated contractual arrangements meet the foJJowing criteria: 
f,:J ; A~ 
( (,)"..!., .. ~.r •. 
·"" -4 .. 'i 
i) 
ii) 
/ ... ) 
111 
vlv) 
v) 
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export contracts must contain provisions which permit adjustments to 
reflect changing market conditions over the life of the contract; · 
exporters must demonstrate that export arrangements provide reasonable 
assurance that volumes contracted will be taken; and 
exporters must demonstrate that producers supplying gas for an export 
project endorse the terms of the export arrangement and any subsequent 
revisions thereof. 
19. The Government of Alberta agrees that the export flowback system shall 
continue in its current form, subject to the actions contemplated in paragraph 
12, until November 1, 19&6, at which time the system will be eliminated. 
NATURAL GAS IMPORTS 
20. There is provision for the import of natural gas in the National Energy Board 
Act and Regulations. 
GENERAL APPLICATION 
21. The Government of Canada has broad responsibilities to ensure that trade 
among provinces and between Canada and its foreign trading partners is 
conducted in a manner which will provide benefits for all Canadians. Nothing in 
this Agreement shall limit Canada's power or its ability to meet its 
responsibilities in relation to interprovincial and interna tiona! trade. 
22. The governments of Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan have broad 
responsibilities with respect to the development of their natural resources. 
Nothing in this Agreement shall limit the producing provinces' powers or their 
ability to meet their responsibilities in relation to their ownership and 
management of their natural resources. 
23. The producing provinces shall retain their right to condition the removal of / 
natural gas from the province to protect provincia! public interest. 
Notwithstanding this basic right of ownership, the producing provinces do not 
intend to use this right to frustrate the intent of this Agreement. Specifically: 
i) Alberta and British Columbia will initiate a review of their respective 
surplus tests to ensure that the tests will contribute to the achievement 
of the market-oriented pricing system contemplated in this Agreement. 
ii) Alberta will review the wording of the Gas Resources Preservation Act, 
specifically Section 5 (3) (c), and as necessary, intends to amend the 
legislation to ensure that it does not require new sales to be incrementa! 
to existing sales prior to November 1, 19&6. 
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Hi) Saskatchewan, in order to decrease its reliance on extraprovincial sources 
of gas, will permit limited quantities of its gas for sale outside the 
province and for direct sale within the province, as a market incentive to 
stimulate exploration of conventional resources. So long as Saskatchewan 
is reliant on extraprovincial gas, the price of gas sold outside the province 
shall be not less than the price at which gas may be purchased in 
Saskatchewan. 
24. Non-arm's-length sales of natural gas between producers and shippers, between 
producers and distributors, or between producers and consumers shall be subject 
to appropriate provincial legislation for ~urposes of determining and collecting 
royalty or mineral tax revenues payable to the respective provincial Crown. 
25. In conjunction with the transition to a more flexible and market-oriented 
pricing regime for domestic natural gas sales, the governments agreed that an 
early and all-encompassing review of the role and operations of interprovincial 
and international pipelines engaged in the buying, selling and transmission of 
gas is in order. Towards this end, the parties agree that the review will be 
carried out by an impartial panel appointed by the Minister of Energy, Mines 
and Resources in consultation with the ministers representing the governments 
of Alberta, British Columbia and Saskatchewan. The review shall be completed 
no later than June 30, 1986 and a final report submitted to the Minister of 
Energy, Mines and Resources on or before July 31, 1986. The details of panel 
membership, mandate and reporting relationship will be made public separately. 
CONSUMING PROVINCES 
26. It is anticipated that the governments of the consuming provinces who are not 
signatories to this Agreement will make changes to ensure the effectiveness of 
the market-sensitive gas pricing regime, including legislative changes and the 
provision of direction to provincial agencies to provide consumers with 
alternative sources of supply through the availability of transportation services 
on distribution systems, and to provide distributors with greater flexibility in 
determining prices for gas sold by them. 
MONITORING 
27. To ensure that the intent and objectives of this ;\greement are achieved, a 
senior official representing each of the parties to this Agreement shall be 
appointed to monitor the implementation of the provisions contained herein 
and, among other things, the degree to which regulatory processes have resulted 
in significantly freer market access. These officials shall report their findings 
on a quarterly basis to their respective ministers. 
28. The parties to this Agreement intend to enact expeditiously the appropriate 
legislative and regulatory changes necessary to implement the market-oriented 
pricing policy contemplated herein. 
,._ 
I 
/ ' 
· Dated on this 31st day of October, 1985. 
For the Government of Canada 
Pat Carney 
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources 
For the Government of British Columbia 
Stephen Rogers 
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources 
-6-
For the Government of Alberta 
John Zaozirny 
Minister of Energy and Natural 
Resources 
For the Government of Saskatchewan 
Paul Schoenhals 
Minister of Energy and Mines 
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DEREGULATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
WESTCOAST (DUKE) ENERGY 
In the last 15+ years, the natural gas industry has undergone a number of policy changes 
with respect to how the industry is regulated. The changes to these regulations have been 
applied to some portions of the industry (gathering and processing) and not others 
(transmission and distribution). What I would like to determine specifically is the effect 
that these regulatory changes have had on Westcoast (Duke) Energy, particularly as they 
relate to the transmission sector of the industry. 
I would ultimately like to provide information on the pros and cons of deregulation from 
one company's perspective, provide an "applied" example of the effects of deregulation, 
and identify whether or not the effects of deregulation on a company are a function of 
scale (the size of the company). Toward that end I have developed the following 
questions: 
1. What are the pros and cons of deregulation of the natural gas industry as you see 
them? 
Pros: 
Cons: 
2. How have these regulatory changes affected the gathering and processing sectors of 
the company? Do you think this is a positive or a negative change? 
3. Have the regulatory changes to a portion of the industry (gathering and processing 
sectors) had any effect on the transmission side of the business as it relates to 
W estcoast (Duke) Energy? 
4. The Western Accord was the government's first step toward deregulating the energy 
industry. It was designed to revitalize the Canadian energy industry by deregulating 
the crude oil pricing and marketing, making the natural gas industry more market-
oriented, and eliminating a number of federal oil and gas taxes or charges including 
the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax, the Petroleum Compensation Charge, and the 
Canadian Ownership Special Charge. Did the Western Accord have any affect on 
W estcoast Energy? 
a. Were there any changes to the marketing of natural gas as a result of the 
Accord? 
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b. Did the elimination of the gas taxes and charges increase Westcoast Energy 
revenues or decrease prices? 
c. The elimination of the Petroleum and Gas Revenue Tax (PGRT) was 
supposed to promote "large-scale reinvestment in Canada". The decade 
following the Western Accord (1985- 1995) was one of large-scale 
diversification and expansion for Westcoast Energy. Did this have anything 
to do with the elimination of the PGRT? 
5. What affect did the Agreement on Natural Gas Markets and Prices have on 
Westcoast? For example, one ofthe goals of the Agreement was to improve market 
access for producers, particularly the export markets. Was this the case? Were there 
any other benefits or drawbacks of this Agreement for Westcoast Energy? 
6. What subsequent regulatory changes (e.g. Incentive Settlements, Framework for 
Light-Handed Regulation) affected Westcoast and how? 
7. There is currently a debate within the natural gas industry as to whether or not 
deregulation should be applied to the transmission and distribution sectors. What do 
you feel would be the consequences of this policy change and how would that affect 
W estcoast (Duke) Energy? 
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